

MODULO 3 comparative politics

09.06.2020

Congruence.

Powell vanberg, election laws, disproportionality and median correspondence.

Blais bodet, does disproportional representation faster closer congruence btwn citizen and policy maker.


Golder stramski paper

Powell, the ideological congruence controversy.

DEMOCRACY.

Congruence is part of the same definition of democracy. One of the element or property of democracy. Large scale democracy is a procedure and/or a mechanism that generates an open oligarchy whose competition on the electoral market attributes power to the people and specifically enforces the responsiveness of the leaders to the led (sartori)

Representation intrinsically consist of two ingredients: responsiveness and independent responsibility. (sartori)



We assume there is at least **one political dimension**, in most of the country is a **left-right dimension** (ideological congruence). We can use a scale, most of the time most percentage are moderate, two tales smallest percentage, not necessarily equal. Bell shaped curve most of the time.

Because of distribution, we can identify **median voter**, place parties on same ideological dimension.

To derive **parties position** we can ask experts, political scientist to place different parties, ask citizen, see party manifestoes checking salience of certain issues, derive the place by self placement, what they feels themselves like.

Once able to place on left right scale we can identify the **median policy maker**, the **median party** in parliament because we know seat distribution.

Then we can **place the government** in this scale.

We can investigate **distance between median voter and median party**. Way to measure **congruence**. Higher congruence smaller the distance.

Citizen (through survey), **median citizen** (voter), **parties** (citizen, experts, party manifestos, self placememnt of supporters) **median party** (legislator), **government** (weighted average seat share or cabinet share, median cabinet party)

Tabella different placement of government in different countries. Non impo.

Most of the people place themselves in the centre of distribution.

Naïf assumption : parties located are not always same, not always 10 parties, tend to vote parties closer to the centre

- **Perfect proportional system >**

Standard deviation > amount of SD perfectly replicated by SD of representative. Distribution of party is a replication in scale of SD of citizen

Correspondence median citizen and median party > in perf prop we have perfect correspondence.

- If we introduce a **threshold**, of any kind, equal to 5, the parties below 5% not represented, so only higher and in centre.

Standard deviation > SD of citizen is the same as before, but reduce SD of representative.

Correspondence > this would not be effected, without the two tales does not change much. Level of correspondence would be probably the same. Does not affect the location of median legislator.

This is a naif assumption, people are not adjusting their behaviour.

TABLE 2 *Vote–Seat Disproportionality and Distance between Citizen and Legislative Medians by Type of Election Laws*

Election law category	Disproportionality		Distance of legislative (party) median from citizen median†		N of cases
	Mean	Standard deviation	Mean	Standard deviation	
<i>PR effective threshold</i>					
Below 4%	1.7	(0.53)	0.68	(0.51)	20
4% to 7%	2.7	(1.04)	0.49	(0.45)	20
7.1 to 13%	7.1	(1.97)	0.94	(0.94)	9
<i>Single Member Districts</i>	12.5	(5.02)	1.47	(0.71)	21
Totals	5.9	(5.47)	0.89	(0.74)	70

Cancel or not at the aggregate level in SMD or disproportional systems
As expected

Overall disproportionality. Tabella

1. Cancel out or not at the aggregate level in SMD or disproportionality system. Not only level of disproportionality is higher in single member district and SD highlight this.
2. We see that distance between median leg and citizen is higher in majoritarian system, far higher than proportional system.
3. Systematically proportional system have a lower distance compare to majoritarian system. If we introduce Pr we decrease distance. (tabella 3) empirically we don't find that the distance is the same, distance is systematically smaller.

Fist article, BLAIS BODET.

Representation is a good thing.

Typically we think that more parties = more choice = more congruence.

But what about the government? As cox point out minimizing the average distance

But we know from PPT that expectations we tend to have for most of the time something closer to two party system, we expect some convergence to represent the median voter to have the majority in the parliament, pivotal party will have government. Median position is covered by the government, so there is no gap in majoritarian system.

If two parties (downs) median position is covered by the pivotal party (=executive), so congruence.

If we have more than two parties it depends from the coordination among moderate sparty.

Pr system

More parties more distributed on left right sale, not concentrated in the mddle of distribution. More disperse. Which parties are more likely of forming a gov. location make a difference, located in the middle are favoured, moderate party have an advantage on extreme party. Centrist parties are better off in coalitional bargain for the executive, so congruence.

Hp 1-5

Data

- Comparative studies of electoral system dataset. CSES. Module 1 survey based research product regarding preference of citizens, module 2 position of parties, module 3 boh. Use first two modules.
- 55 elections

- Citizens self placed and party placement 1-10 (not expert or manifestos)
- DV = median party distance for z parties in j countries vedi formule
= diversity (party dispersion on voters dispersion) “ “

H1

If we regress, see by using CV of consolidated democracy, see ?? is inversely related to diversity. More proportional = more diversity. Confirmed.

H2

Inverse relationship, higher disproportionality = lower number of parties. Confirmed.

Dv

??? formula

Average distance btwn voters and cabinet > for each contry. DV would be average distance. Formula.

HP 3 ,,,,

Here we have diversity and a quadratic relation with number of parties in coalition with distance. The more party the less distance, more congruence. But square reflect a not linear relationship, is positive so increase the double the size.

If we plot the effect we obtain the graph. X = number of parties in gov, Y = distribution of cabinet. Line = effect of distance, prediction of distance decrease until 3 4 party government. Level of distance produce is samller compared to single party government. Coalition government tend to lower distance and better congruence.

Regression, diversity decreases distance, putting together

HP 5

No difference at all btw majority and prop, against common thinking. Important because is a negative evidence, we have not found anything apparently, but is useful. We use a quantitative analysis.

Conclusion vedi grafico.

Second article, POWELL.

Usually it is taken for granted (and has been empirically proven) that consensus democracy and PR system represent better and assure higher congruence. More able to represent preferences of the citizens so expect higher level of congruence. But blas-bodet and golder-stramski suggest that the results are better because they used better data. Better and more recent data CSES 1996-2005 data. Is true that new data are better than old ones?

Different ways to locate parties. See graph.

New results are due to the superior characteristics of the sources, or to something else?

Check robustness of the results on the same 1996-2005 period of CSES using other methods (it's impossible the other way round).

On data :

- HP = the difference in congruence (distance from median voter on left.right scale) between SMD system and PR system will be similar wether measured by manifesto, cit-ex, or cit-perc of estimating citizen and government position.
- HP1a = absolute distances will be less (congruence greater) if measured by manifestos
- HP1b

Tabella 1. Take different periods, we cannot use this method before 1986, nobody asked citien. We see that manifesto method are average ideological distance in these decade, N = number of election helded.

- Manifesto : Distance is most of the time smaller in PR system compare to Maj system. Small and close exceptitons.

- Citizen expert : higher distance in MAJ system. Evidence was not better and new data, just new data. So first and second HP are confirmed. Independently of the data, one of the two system have better results on congruence.

What is different in 1996-2005?

On governments formation.

- HP 2 = government formation under SMD election rules is usually dominated by the plurality vote-winning party.
- HP 2a = government congruence under SMD is usually determined by the distance between the median voter and the plurality vote winner.
- HP 3 government formation under PR election rules is shaped by the median legislative party and the plurality vote winning
- HP 3a
- HP 4a = under SMD elections rules, party competition should lead the plurality vote winner to be close to the median voter
- HP 4b = under PR election rules, party competition and accurate vote-cscat aggregation should lead to the median legislative party to be close to the median voter. The plurality vote winner, if different, should be further away from the median voter.

Cox argues that the fact ,,,,,,

Blais boden nn im,,,,

- HP 5 = in time period when the plurality vote winner are close to the median voter under SMD, the SMD system will have better congruence because the need to add another party (ex the plurality party) ,,,,,,

Table 2. consider just majority system, in different decades. Compared to the 40s and 70s (base line), have confirmation that certain decades are systematically different.

Cabinet is systematically smaller only for single member district. 90s compared to 40s, 90s systematically smaller. Independently from method we recognize that all other decades are pretty similar, but 90s are clearly exceptional, clearly lower distance and higher congruence. 90s different not just in the gap but within the family of majority system. The exceptionality of the effect for SMD system is explained by the distance of the plurality party (as under HP 2a).

About PR system, table 3. Compare introduce both distance between median voter and party and median party and both. Systematically all decades both variables are relevant. Confirmed that Powell suggest in HP 3a, in PR congruence is determined by both,,,,,,

Table 4, maj and pr together. Using three different methods in different decades. Regression explains the ideological distance between voters and gov using dummy variable for majority system and introducing distance between legislative median and median voters and 1,28,00,,,,,,

If the distance between legislative median and median citizen is equal to 0? Perfectly covered by median party, what expect from combination of Duverger law and down hp. Coefficient goes to 0 (leg med distance) so in case is equal to = according to HP 5 remain just with the constant of system + coefficient of majority dummy variable. Independent from period and method dummy variable is negative, whenever legislative median equals median citizen, majority system are better than majority system (duv + downs).

If legislative median is different to 0. Prop system dummy is 0, interaction terms goes to 0, so effect would be legislative median distance to median voter/citizen explain effect of pr system.

In non pr system, subtract dummy and add interaction coefficient.

Plotting a graph. Take first regression manifesto in long period from 40s to 2003. Single member district cabinet distance is equal to constant – SMD dummy + legislative median and voter median distance + legislative median

See graph formula. 1,34,00,,,,,,

1,40,,,

Conclusion

The results of blais-bodet and golder-stramski depend on the specificity of that 1996-2004 period, more than on better data or better models.

Pr ideological congruence is usually better and constatnt

SMD can be

10.06.2020

CONGRUENCE 2

M golder and stramski, ideological congruence and electoral institutions.

M golder and Lloyd, re-evolutioning the relationship between electoral rules and ideological congruence.

Article 1.

We can locate parties and identify median legislator and so the position of the government computing. Simple idea that different way of measuring congruence all starts with the idea of distance.

Figure 1 conceptualizing ideological congruence.

Most simple way of conceptualize congruence is **the 1 on 1 relationship**. Citizen measure certain congruence if they are represented. 1 to 1. Measure the actual distance between each citizen and each representative. Congruence is high when the absolute distance between the citizen and the representative is small.

Absolute median citizen congruence = $|MC-CI|$

determine different measure, for example position of the cabinet. Absolute median citizen congruence identify position of median legislator and position of the representative, and compute the absolute distance between median citizen and representative (government).

Figura 2.

We could have a different measure. Similar to blais and boden. **Absolute citizen congruence**, congruence is high when the average absolute distance between the citizens and the representative is small.

Absolute citizen congruence = $1/N \sum |Ci - G|$

Important, assume curve is not bell shaped, example rectangle. No one position at extreme and all evenly concentrated in centre. Median position as median citizen.

Relative citizen congruence. Many to one. Congruence is high when the absolute distance between the citizens and their representative is small relative to the dispersion of citizen preferences.

Formula :

If we compare impact of electoral system on level of congruence and do not take into consideration citizen distribution, we are comparing nothing. Which method is the best? Depends on your research question. Relative solves some methodological problems of equivalence and compatibility. No measure clearly superior.

Final relationship. Congruence **many to many**. Congruence is high when the distribution of citizens and representative preferences are similar. It is perfect when the two distribution ,,

Cumulative distribution functions, graph.

Different cases in which same shape of distribution is moved to right/left, so not overlapping with citizen median voter. Overall rectangular distribution of a bell shaped, (country c). may have same median legislator and citizen but overall shape is different. Measure the **grey area, area of non overlap**. Country c, grey area is bigger, more extreme and less centrist, so more overlapping, cross overlap.

Graph and formulas.

CASO. the measure you take, the result you get.

Israel 2003 gvt was (out of 41) 4 in term of relative citizen congruence, 19 absolute median citizen congruence, 35 absolute citizen congruence.

Data = CSES 1996-2005, 70 election surveys, 36 countries.

Self-placement 0-10

Party placement 0-10

IV = formula, disproportionality

PR = duverger + downs (many parties + located in each point, centrifugal tendencies) > so expect many to many congruence.

Duverger > coalition governments > so many to many congruence.

,,,,, part sotto che non silegge

Grafico.

- Simple means, average of **ABSOLUTE MEDIAN CITIZEN CONGRUENCE** for example. Gap median citizen and cabinet. Measured in different system, check if gap is significant. Despite being smaller, we not have so many cases the gap of 0.4 is not significant. We can't say maj system are better.
- **ABSOLUTE CITIZEN CONGRUENCE** = Gap is smaller but significant. So in favour of maj system
- **RELATIVE CITIZEN CONGRUENCE** = are the same. Given the low number of cases to test if gap is significant or not.

Table 2.

Second IV, run a regression of **DV on disproportionality**. Coefficient significant for affecting? No results are. Always negative, more disproportionality systems have lower distance and higher congruence. But non-significant, we cannot say anything. Results similar even with standard errors robust.

Table 3

Distances is higher for majoritarian system but due to non-high number of cases is not significant.

Table 4

Despite number of cases. More disproportionality have higher distance so lower congruence.

Conclusion

Mostly negative evidence (against stereotypes):

The formula does not make any difference in congruence, for most measures of many to one congruence.

It does not make any difference even for the many to many measure of congruence.

Disproportionality does not make any difference for all measures of many to one congruence.

The only positive evidence go in opposite direction:

The formula makes differences in favour of MAJ for the absolute citizen congruence

Disproportionality

ARTICLE 2 written after powell and blais. And original paper of golden, previous article.

The ideological congruence controversy.

- Powell observed for many cases find opposite by using party manifestos data, most of the time pro system have mor or less same level of congruence while majority system have higher variation. Maybe 40-90s was an exception.

Dataset

20 countries, 328 elections 1946-2003. Party manifestoes (ri-Le)

Cabinet congruence = government ideological congruence = IMV-GI formula:

Dummy variable for MAJ system (SMD)

Powell : pR have highrt congruence and lower variabli,,,,,,

Graph: Powell simply introduced the gap. Cabinet congruence from 40s to 90s and compared pr and maj system. Only exception was 1996 period when maj distance is smaller than pr system. Most of the decades we get distance is equally higher in maj system, congruence is higher in pr system most of the time.

Problem = this averages are computed in small number of cases. small degree of variability represented by standard deviation. check if difference is systematic or not. test difference in means of the two values and most of the time is not systematic. p value is 0.36, so apparently are more congruent, but gap is not enough given high variability around the means. Also overall seems in favour of pr system, but problem not check if is systematic, so compute t test, we assume all observation are independent, but they are clearly not, we have some election from same countries. Clustering standard error (penultima Colonna) recognize they come from 20 countries with repeated elections we see some becomes non-significant (under 0.5) only in the 80s we have better relations for pr system.

On variability table.

Is not true that pr system are more constant in congruence. Average of different cases, make difference not so systematic.

Table 2 heteroskedastic regression

Should have line perfectly into point around regression. Error is wider in portion of a graph and not in another. The point form a triangle around the regression. Those are risk of standard deviation related to cases. Heteroskedastic regression. Problem is that regress dependent variable on my independent variable (in this case summy) instead of simply regressing also moel in same regression the variability compare to the same independent variable. Not just the average level of gov vcongruence depending of tye of electoral system. Model mean effect vaverage, but also try to model the variation of congruence on each level of independent variable. We get this graph.

Firt part classic regression.no effect at all of having a maj instead of pr because effect is not systematic.

Then also model variation in level f congruence on each piint, variation in this case depend on same independent variable. Estimate the variation of congruence depending on being a maj instead of pr system. Coefficient is negative, maj system produce lower vaiation in congruence, but since is not systematic there is not systematic effect.

Replicate this decades afrter decades. Weakly significant ipact. Exception 60s, 90s positive effect of SMD on congruence.

Legislative congruence

Legislative ideological congruence = $IMV - MLI$

Median voter and emdian legislator. Good reasons for having high congruence in both PR and MAJ system or dispersion and downs theories.

Yet conditiond for MAJ are more difficult to obtain.

LEGISLATIVE COGNRUENCE HP = legislative ideological congruence will be lower and more variable in majoritarian democracies than in proportional ones.

Have expectations that both can be higher.

Table 3.

This one have dependent variable legislative ideological congruene. SMD prou e effect ncreasing distance. Moduel variance, get systematic. In line with powell expectations.

Two step process.

Electoral and party competition > size and ideological position of parties. Legislative congruence.

Government formation > from those legislative position that produce government congruence.

Conclusion

Powell's results about cabinet congruence are disconfirmed (no difference)

Admittedly PR favours legislative congruence

Yet, given the distribution of parliamentary seats (a certain level of congruence) MAJ improves cabinet congruence.

15.06.2020

CONGRUENCE AND SWD BEYOND LEFT AND RIGHT.

Scecker and tausandpfund, multidimensional government-citizen, congruence and satisfaction with democracy.

Measure of congruence will go beyond as ideological congruence measured on left right scale, propose different type of congruence, measure of different scales.

Authors analysed

- **15 eu countries**
- Using **ESS** European social survey data (citizen) and **CHES** (government) chapel hill expert survey. Mostly obtained the suggestion that identify other scale beyond traditional left and right. In order to place the parties, expert CHES data are used to locate parties in a continuum.
- **DV** is taken from **ESS, satisfaction with democracy**, range from 0 to 10, rescaled 0-100.
- **IV** is **policy distance**, measure of congruence. Instead of many to one relationship (averages and gaps from median voters and gov) in this case since the unit of analysis is single correspondence, we don't have to aggregate, **one to one relationship**. Each response confronted with location of gov. scale ranging from 0 to 1 not only left and right but other 5 different scales. In total 6 issues:
 - **LR scale, redistribution, social lifestyle, EU integration, environment, immigration.**

Table A1 question used for the research on both ESS and CHES. 6 issues.

SWD is related to:

- **Macrolevel** variables: **input** (procedural quality = fair and free elections, respect the rule of law. institutional setting,...). **Output** (policies, gov effectiveness,..) if agree with policies, grant growth, reduce unemployment.
- **Microlevel** variables, **individual** issues, characteristics. **Congruence** is individual because each response has his own level of congruence. The closer to the cabinet the more satisfied tend to be. Winners vs losers.

HP1 e 2

'''

Idea that distance matters has no deal with capacity to citizen to judge properly. These variables interact with distance and produce satisfaction, hp 2. Not only hp 1 can influence SWD.

Graph

15 european countries, mean value of SWD. Box is median distance of the citizens to the government.

GRAPH 2

Statistic for other variables used either as control variables.

REGRESSION

- **Dummies for each countries.** Recognize that there are many reasons for certain countries because SWD is different from other countries. Example Bulgaria or Hungary. Reasons why on average is less satisfied in the way democracy is working. Introducing age of democracy. France for example is different. So introduced a lot of variables to explain each case, dummy. Heterogeneity unknown and difference of each country. Whatever is specific and cannot be generalized, specific single countries characteristic or culture related to SWD is contained in specific dummy variables. Captured by

dummy country variables. Other 14 variables to capture difference between each country and a base randomly chosen base line level. For example Belgium. Also cope with structure of these data, taken on a longer 6 year period and different surveys (da mettere tra dati,,,, at least 3 social surveys) so dummy variables capture if respondent belong to the same countries, in more than one year of surveys.

- Model 1, only LR dimension
- Model 2 3, without LR there is a u shaped relationship btwn LR and European integration. Sometimes LR has to do with some social lifestyle idea, immigration,... without LR to see how work together. For all we have same sign, so same correlation. Only environmental protection is different, maybe more recent or minority younger citizens. If introduce LR together with these IV also migration is non significant. First three kept significance and sign, so not overlap in explain variance. So first hp is confirmed and improved if introduce individual level control variables
- Model 4 individual level control variables,,,, vedi grafico,,,,
- Model 5 all combination of politics and 6 dimension. Obtain conditional coefficient. Plot the results. See the graph.

Plot module 4

Plot module 5 six graph.

Marginal impact of distance on 6 different dimension on SWD. This graph means that for the same level of distance, the impact of reduction of SDW is larger for people strongly interested in politics. Not interested is not irrelevant, different from 0, important also for them but clearly less important respect to interested. Redistributive issues is clearer. Slope is deeper the larger is the interactive effect. For people uninterested in politics redistributive position is almost irrelevant. The more interested you are, the same distance produce higher consequences.

Same for social lifestyle and e integration.

Responsiveness graph.

More or less same clear. People who don't ask much for responsiveness are more irrelevant. Below 0 line. Distance has a negative effect for people who ask for responsiveness. Do not apply to LR dimension, both negative. Less relevant for people who ask for responsiveness, not apply on environmental protection. Impact of distance is conditioned by people asking for responsiveness.

Last conditional relationship: salience citizens attached to each of these issues.

Party specific marginal effect see graph.

Country dummies graph. Authors used country dummies. Usual OLS there is an index with i.country, prefix of all dummies. All 14 compared to the base line random selected. Using dummy capture all local element that cannot be generalized and cope with the fact that respondent belong to the same countries in more than one survey. Clustering standard error, running OLS clustering standard error by countries,

Graph 2 cluster. Same decreasing trend, same coefficient more or less. But country interval is extremely large, confidence interval for LR overlap 0 line. Problem here is that clustering SE work asymptotically. If many countries, having just 15 countries is not enough at least double or more. SE would probably be biased. Apply to some model before.

Alternative panel regression with fixed effect. Graph.

Similar to OLS with country dummy variable, not the same but very similar. Running fixed effect especially with time observation, not compare one country with the others, just look within country effect. Cross country variation and in country variation. Different observation for different time period, modify research question the fixed effect. ?? modifies research question, more change in independent variable then certain change in the dependent variable. The larger the increase in the distance the larger the decrease in the satisfaction. Slightly different HP.

Rando effect graph.

Put together country and longitudinal variation. Criticized because difficult controlling heterogeneity of results. Not only by political scientist, but also statistician, econometrician, economists.

1h28,,,,,

1h31,,,

Table

More or less same results. Last two variables not relevant here. Social lifestyle here is significant. Some minor differences. Check differences. Replicated also marginal effect, graph

Results are pretty close to original but not the same. Problem with multilevel model is that they have the same limits of clustering the standard errors.

CONGRUENCE AND SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY 2, non impo

,,,, data vedi slide.

Multilevel structure. Observations are nested, not individual.

16.06.2020

CONGRUENCE OVER THE MANDATE

Ferland B, ideological congruence government mandates under majoritarian and proportional representation electoral system.

The expectations

As Pitkin underlines, democratic representation involves not only a monetary agreement between rules and ruler, but a process that forms and sustains congruence as policy makers are chosen and authorised.

- Usually we measure the congruence after the election (seldom perfect, and thus there is room for improvement).
- Congruence during the mandate (if government adjust their policies and priorities following the citizens' feedbacks).

Electoral system affect: the capacity to adjust to those preferences. The incentives to adjust to the citizens' preferences (for being re elected for example). First part being able to adjust, second be willing to adjust. Possibility and willing. Possibility of being re elected could represent an incentive.

A veto player approach: idea is that in pr system expect more parties and so more veto players.

- More VPS, larger heterogeneity > more stability > less adjustment
- More VPS, larger heterogeneity > not equally convenient + blurring responsibilities > less incentives

Is more difficult to adjust, coalition gov less capable to adjust to the preferences of citizens. Secondly more veto player or ideological range make less convenient for adjusting. If a coalition gov is difficult for citizen to attribute the change to a member.

Hp 1

Single party government (in SMD system) improve their congruence (during the mandate) than coalition governments (in pr system).

Hp 2 party system polarization.

Party system polarisation increases the incentives for congruence (otherwise the area around the median voter will be already crowded). So majoritarian government improve congruence only in case of polarised system

Data

- CSES + national ES. Comparative studies of electoral system systematic surveys, initially used by Clark and Golden. + national electoral surveys,

To locate parties at t , after the election and at $t+1$, at the end of the mandate. $t - (t+1)$.

,,,,, 20 circq
24

Run a regression. Introduce a control variable: move of median citizen. Obtain this graph.

- Controlling change of median citizen for majoritarian system the dummy variable is equal to 0. We have a negative effect of maj system. We remain with a constant. Maj government move away negatively.
- Pr. If we add pr to this there is no effect at all. Compare to non pr, pr improve more once we control for the position of the citizens. The gap will be the same.
- Under pr system median citizen move away from pr cabinet, and pr cabinet tend to adjust. Under maj we have the opposite. Maj cabinet re adjust their own preferences for the future, and citizen adjust.

The change in congruence between median citizen and government is similar in PR and MAJ system. Yet: in PR, citizen move away from the government while in MAJ governments move away from the citizens.

Studiens on responsiveness show h,,,,,,

Vps and capability graph. Reminder

Hp1a : A government's ideological ,,,, 34,25

Polarization

If we have median citizen there is no space for movement, only benefits the gov itself. (Graph line a). there is no break for adjustment of government. Case b, space is occupied by other parties, less polarized situatin, government doesn't really benefit from adjustment, benefit only party D.

Palloni graph.

Freccie graph. Polarization is seen as a conditional variable.

H3,h4 h5

The marginal effect o

DATA and MEASURES

- CSES + national ES.
Advantages: They grant Sufficient variation. If add national ES with same question we enlarge time. Use same scale and same moment (after the election). ES not run in the same moment of election compare to CSES.
MC is computed independently from party position. Not a shortcoming of ES, but of party manifestos.
- Only Parliamentary regimes, 16 countries from 1973-2013, 86 elections. Because under pres different way to elect him. Most similar system in order to reduce heterogeneity.
Only uninterrupted government not formed within.
- Absolute government congruence. Distance between cabinet and median citizen.
- Measure of polarisation: modified Dalton's measure of polarisation (only opposition parties compared to MC)

Issue how to locate parliament at the end of the mandate, surveys sometimes are immediately after the election. $T+1$ before and $t+1$ after the election. We don't have pre electoral subveys, $t+1$ before. Assumption: use as a proxy for position before election the location according to position of parties after the elections. People not change position of parties after the elections. 51,,, graph

Graph 53 ,,,, www.unidocs.it

17.06.2020

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS, and political competition in comparative politics.

Party located in a LR dimension, electorate position, position of candidate and position of MP and position of leadership of parties. We need a political space defended by a continuum to measure distance. Many pol issues are not of that kind, non continuum, measure degree of attention given to certain issues. Lack of attention is equal to non interested in such politics.

Link Eurobarometer, question regularly repeated, one is which are the two most important issues facing your country at the moment, same for EU and personally. Primi 18 miuti??

CAP comparative agenda project. Other data. Impo?? Primi 32 minuti??

Preferences in terms of priority, level of saliency > party that spend resources, time, or anything to the topic (government attention to certain problem) > public policies. If able to resolve problems, it could have an effect on new preferences.

Preferences > party, government attention > public policies > preferences

Democratic representation intrinsically consist of two ingredients: responsiveness and independent responsibility, Satori.

A key of democracy is the continued responsiveness of the government to the references of the people, Dahl.

The A.A. test this relationship between people and political elite using data regarding most important problem, get from different surveys, and try to match those preferences with data regarding rhetoric of political elite, what they promise in public speeches and eventually real and actual policy by looking in the change in spending on different topics.

The authors test ideal relationship with data regarding public preferences and data regarding the gov promises and their actual conduct (budgetary allocation) in 6 policy areas and 3 very different countries (US, UK and DK). The reason why choose because located in different areas in western world,

Institutional and contingent factors affecting government responsiveness:

- Electoral contestability: direct accountability and uncertainty.
- Executive discretion (institutional constraints). If the gov could be in check by another institutions or not. Clear dominance of gov on legislature or not. Principal agent framework.

HP Contestability, direct accountability

- HP1 = directly elected executives are more responsive to public priorities than indirectly elected executives.

Pres system should be more responsive than parl system. Long chain of delegation in parl.

- HP2 = executives in plurality systems are less responsive to the public's priorities than executives in proportional system.

In maj system certain district are safe, already know who is gonna win.

Hp contestability, uncertainty

- HP 3 = the greater the uncertainty about the future electoral contest, the higher the responsiveness of the executive.

Hp executive discretion

- HP 4 = executives in systems with horizontal separation of power are more responsive to the public than executives in systems where policies are implemented unilaterally.

Has to do with idea of check and balance. Second institutions that is able to non-approve will of executives and at the same time veto power of executives there are more VP and greater correspondence to the preferences of population.

- HP 5 = when there is a conflict of interests,,

Idea that in a pres system the divided government (majority in support of president not in both parliament) the final policy behaviour will be close to the priorities of population. Same in parl system in case of minority government. Executive not control alone the policy making.

HP and CASES 1970/2005 us uk dk.

Table 1. 1h06

Operationalization

- Public preferences : from common/similar surveys: what do you consider to be the most important problem facing your country? Six policy categories: defense, law and order, public health, housing, education, social services.
- Government promises : content analysis of annual public speeches in three countries. Example state of the union's speech, queen's speech, prime minister's opening speech to the parliament...
- Budgetary choices : from OECD database on national accounts.

Table 2. understand how dataset works. Recode most important problems of population in six categories. Sum of all value equal to 100%.

Model formula 1h16

First one relative attention in speeches

Second change in expenditure.

Expectations

Table

DV = relative salience in rhetoric and relative budgetary choices.

Table

First united states. Rethorical part model 1a 1b.

preferences reflect positively on speeches. More people say defense is important the more president should talk about that. Other here topics positively. Only exception is health, always a problematic topic in USA, different administration tend to avoid talking.

Ideology = non important in US for defense, is important for law and order. Ideology does not enter so much in speeches.

Figure 1 = 1h31

Model 2a,2b budgetary allocation usa.

other two countries.

Graph 1h36

Summarizing

Us: both rethorical and actual responsiveness are high

UK. Both low

DK half way

Moreover very few relationship against prediction (and sensible explanations), different role of ideology, responsiveness on average higher for non popular governments.