

• Waltz – Reductionism and Systemic Theories (IR 2/02 morning)

In his book Waltz distinguishes between:

- **Reductionist theories = investigate a complex phenomenon studying how its parts behave → international relations = result of the aggregation of single actions**
 - Studying the parts (*units*) to understand the whole → social sciences = explain social phenomena starting from the interaction of the units/individuals → explain how individuals actions aggregate to form the broader phenomenon **IN THE SAME WAY**
 - IR and domestic factors as explaining factors → reductionists tend to explain world politics starting from the domestic factors variables within states (how they are internally organized, cultural/political ideologies...)
- **Systemic theories =**
 - Studying the whole (*system*) to understand how the parts interact (system used for example in biology)
 - → Waltz = he states that he had been the first scholar to use this method properly to study international relations → for that very reason he claimed that he was introducing a new form of realism → = neo-realism (= *systemic* or *structural realism*)

Limits of reductionist theories

- Different states produce similar (as well as different) outcomes (foreign policies)
Similar states produce different (as well as similar) outcomes (foreign policies) → looking at international history, we can **NOT** see an **unambiguous relationship between the kind of state and their behaviour** regarding foreign affairs (ex: the USSR and USA in the Cold War bipolar system = despite their differences at the domestic level, their foreign policies were very similar): “The same causes sometimes lead to different effects, and the same effects sometimes follow from different causes” (K. Waltz) → **There should be something outside the state domestic policy that influence their behaviour**
- **The distance between aims and results** → in international history is easy to find a gap between the promises leaders made during their electoral campaign and what they really did once they got elected → this is so common that there should be something that make them change their mind (ex: states in which happened a revolution (Russia, France...) = we should expect a revolution also in the management in their foreign policy, that however didn't happen)
“In the history of international relations [...] results achieved seldom correspond to the intentions of the actors” (Waltz)
- **Can the analytic method work in IR as it does in physics?** → when you can apply the analytic method (so when “relations among several factors can be resolved into relations between pairs of variables while *other things are held equal*”(K. Waltz)”, such as physics) then it is possible to adopt the reductionist approach; however that is NOT the case of international politics (the general international environment DO effect every relation) → as the international arena affect every relation between states, it is not possible to apply the analytical method in IR, and thus neither the reductionist approach → every state is part of a more general construct, whose relationships and constraints affect its decisions.

COMMON MISUNDERSTANDINGS: what is true is that:

- 1) Domestic factors do *matter*
- 2) The international system alone cannot explain how states behave

However what Waltz was saying was not to ignore the domestic policy BUT that just that it is necessary to look primarily at the international structure and the relative constraints, and then the domestic policy → **in order to have a complete view it is necessary to look at the international structure (the systemic level) and integrate with states' domestic policies**

3) Systemic approaches investigate *two levels*: The system and the interactions between the units → systemic theorist are interested in the interaction between the units (states) and the international structure (that is the results of units' interactions) → in this sense IR shall be interpreted as markets (there are constraints)

• How the International structure affects states behaviour – IR 2 Feb afternoon

International Structures are an abstract concept, that can be thought of as a 'field of forces', in which the actors are continually affected by those forces. Alternatively, it can be defined as a 'set of constraining forces' which shape and affect states behaviour. Forces are perceived consciously by political leaders, which plan their actions according to the limits that the structure exercises on them.

Key features of structures:

1- Structures reward some behaviours and punish others (ex. markets). IR can be interpreted as a market, in which states are the economic agents. Some policies are rewarded while others have consequences.

2- Structures can be used to explain the uniformity of state behaviour. All states behave more or less in the same way, pursuing their self-interests, although they are very different from one another. This is because the Structure tends to make uniform the heterogeneous behaviours of states. (The same happens in society: many different individuals behave the same way).

3- Socialization & Competition - States are socialized to international behaviour. Diplomatic customs are the same all over the world. Competition between states is also important: it incentivizes some behaviours and discourages others.

4- Structures do not determine the behaviour of states, they just shape it. Structures provide constraints and regulations, but the action of states is not determined by it. (=MARKETS; markets have constraints but they do not determine the behaviour of economic actors)

5- The essential difference between domestic and international arenas

	International Structure	Domestic Structure
<i>Ordering principles</i>	ANARCHY	HIERARCHY
<i>Character of the unity</i>	FUNCTIONAL SIMILARITY	FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION
<i>Distribution of capabilities</i>	INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER	DOMESTIC DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

6- Structuralist comparison – Multilateralism vs Bipolarism

Bipolar systems are structurally organized around two superpowers, while in multilaterals systems power is shared between many great powers → **bipolar systems are more stable** – superpowers are continental supremacy and great military capabilities, they are less likely to collapse. Easier to communicate – superpowers can coordinate better.

The English School - IR 7 Feb

- **European Tradition: *Unorthodox Realism***

After the end of WW2, due to the hegemony of the United States, IR became a predominantly American science. In the 60s and 70s some key European scholars emerged (→ Raymond Aron, “Paix et Guerre entre les Nations” - Carl Schmitt, “Der Nomos der Erde”). However, the predominant IR school in Europe during the Cold War was the English School.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT: Cold war, decolonization, end of the British Empire and of European centrality.

The “British Committee” → multidisciplinary, built on Grotius’ ideas (English School is also called Grotian Tradition / Grotian theory of IR) – they found in Grotius the anticipation of the notion of International Society.

Most influential scholars: **Martin Wright, Hedley Bull**, Herbert Butterfield, Adam Watson

- **Heterodox Realism vs. American Neorealism**

<u>Common features</u>	<u>Dissimilarities</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ International anarchy (as the fundamental aspect of world politics) ▪ Focus on political power (that matters more than ideas) ▪ State-centrism ▪ Pessimistic view (the historical continuity of power politics) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Historical sensitivity ▪ Attention paid to geopolitics & space ▪ IL & Institutions matter ▪ Domestic factors matter ▪ Culture & Ideology matter ▪ Multidisciplinary: the <i>classical approach</i>

-**Historical sensitivity**= Great attention to history, not present in American Scholars, which are more focused on present events. Members of the English School were very interested and knowledgeable in history. History is fundamental to understand international politics.

-**Attention to geopolitics and space**= The same attention given to history is also applied to the geographical aspect of politics. The American school does not take geography into account. For English scholars, geography plays an important role in international dynamics.

-**Multidisciplinary**= Europeans tend to integrate as many disciplines as possible to understand power politics.

European scholars tend to integrate a classical realist view with a new approach taking into consideration the history, culture, geography, institutional background of the countries analysed.

- **The English School – International Society – 8 Feb**

Key distinction: **International System vs International Society** → The International System is a group of actors of the international arena, which behave according to a rational approach. In this system states act egoistically and strategically (American realism). International Society also takes into account the social aspect of the discipline. **SOCIAL MEMBERSHIP**: actions of states are influenced by social factors.

We can define three scenarios:

1- International actors are isolated → there is neither an International System nor an International Society. The actions of one state do not influence the others. No strategic thinking. **VERY RARE**

2- International actors are part of a system. The actions of one state influence the others. There is strategic thinking: before acting, states consider the reactions of other states.

3- International Society. More than an International System: states are part of a strategic system, but they also share common values and norms. Interactions between states are not exclusively strategic.

An International System needs to be present in order to have an International Society.

The EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY is the main historical example: European power relations cannot be explained only through power politics, there is something more.

-DEFINITION:

«A *society of states* exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in the relations with one another»

(H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 1977)

In order to have an International Society, states have to be conscious of being part of a social context.

-There is no parallelism between an International Society and a society made of humans, for these reasons:

1- International Societies are made of states, not individuals (state centrism). Behaviour of states is different from behaviour of individuals. 2- International Societies are anarchical. There is no central authority. (HOWEVER, the International Society is not devoid of order).

English realists reject the idea that there is an analogy between states in an anarchical environment and individuals in the state of nature (Hobbes). For English scholars (Hedley Bull), it is not true that the only way to have order in the international arena is to build a centralized World Government.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THIS VIEW:

I- The state of nature for states is not what Hobbes described for individuals. Unlike humans, states are able to trade, industrialize, have legal regimes and morality in a situation of anarchy.

II- Hobbes: "it is necessary to be subjects to a ruler in order to have protection and security" – NOT TRUE. Fear of state authority is not the only reason why individuals act lawfully. Individuals respect order also for a sense of morality.

III- States are not like Individuals. They are less vulnerable and less equal. A hierarchy between states exists: not *bellum omnium contra omnes* because not everyone is a threat to everyone else. States can tolerate a certain level of anarchy.

-Elementary goals of any society: Ensuring security for its members; ensuring that promises will be kept and agreements carried out; ensuring the possession of things.

-Goals of any International society: Preserving the International Society itself; Maintaining the independence of its members; Keeping the peace; + Ensuring the elementary goals of any society (security, promises, possessions).

• **The European International Society – 9 Feb**

History: From the Peace of Westphalia (1648; symbolic birth of the state) to the 20th century (decline of the European International Society).

Geography: Europe and the Eurocentric power structure

Culture: Political homogeneity (monarchic state); same cultural background

Basic power institutions: “Not organizations or administrative machineries, but rather a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals” (Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 1977)

- **Modern Sovereignty:** based on the territorial state. The appearance of the absolutist state caused a rationalization of international politics as a set of interstate relations.
- **Balance of Power:** Rather than an institution, a value to be preserved. The international Society is based on a plurality of independent states. The presence of a dominant power is a risk to the International Society itself.
- **IL and Diplomacy:** The ability of European powers to share and develop common norms that may not be formally written. European powers shared the interest in preserving their respective domestic jurisdictions, so they consciously developed norms to help maintain peaceful relations between them.
- **War:** The limitations of organized violence & the monopoly of the legitimate use of force led to an institutionalization of war.
- **Great Powers:** Powers that, while still being part of a society, were able to develop international responsibility. Great Powers have the responsibility to manage international crises in order to avoid war. XIX century: THE CONCERT OF EUROPE → peace was preserved thanks to the efforts of Great Powers in managing crises and avoiding war.

Sovereignty

The territorial dimension of European states created the conditions through which IR were rationalised as relations among states. Sovereignty is the product of a historical development (≠ American school – sovereignty is taken from granted), a long process which started from the Middle Ages. This resulted in a political order organized around a small number of Great Powers.

Personification of states: related to the period of Renaissance and the idea of individuality. States are ‘super-individuals’ part of a community. Simplified the creation of IR as relations between states. INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTIVITY: States became at the same time the rulers and the subject of the rules. Collective development, not the result of the actions of some isolated states. Monopolization of international relations: rejection of non-state actors. The government is the only body which possesses international personality inside a state → internal sovereignty. No other superior power is recognized → external sovereignty.

Balance of Power

“A state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others”

(Vattel, *The Law of Nations*, 1758)

Balance of power became a value. It was a common interest of European Great Powers to live in a society in which no state could dominate another.

1713 – Peace of Utrecht: Great Powers promised to preserve the balance of power. Balance of Power became an institution.

Balance of power is a prerequisite to other institutions: Diplomacy and IL, Institutionalization of War.

Balance of power is necessary to preserve the International Society → avoiding the hegemony of a single Great Power is a prerequisite for the existence of a Society of sovereign states.

War

The European System, being a society, was able to adopt a number of measures limiting war. Before 1648: religious wars. Disorganized warfare, no territorial boundaries. After that, European powers 'de-theologized' conflicts, which turned wars for religious reasons into organized confrontations between states. International violence is framed as a relation between states. No other type of violence is considered legitimate. MONOPOLIZATION OF THE USE OF FORCE. War is thought of as a duel, with rules and norms that must be followed. Armies confront themselves in an organized way. (setting time and location for battles, officially declaring war, limiting damage to civilians...) These measures were never the standard for warfare, they are a creation of the European International Society.

- **The crisis of the International Society**

IR scholars recognize the XX century as the period of crisis of the European International Society. The global society of states can be considered as a product of the expansion of the *Ius Publicum Europeum* to a global scale. After WW1 the Eurocentric world started to collapse into a cultural and ideologically heterogeneous system. Furthermore, in the contemporary world state sovereignty is no longer a basic institution (failed states).

European scholars provide an overturned image compared to their American counterparts: the crisis which began in the early XX century represents the triumph of the American model of IR.

- **Neo-Institutionalism – IR 15/02**

Origins of Neo-institutionalism: **Idealism in the first debate** → Interwar period - Wilson proposes international organizations as a solution to major wars (however, neo-institutionalism is not necessarily associated with idealism); **Functionalism** → 40s – 60s – David Mitrany, Ernst Haas observed the process of European integration and how it affected politics. Complex division of labour and ramification of cooperative practices among European nations. Technical cooperation which goes beyond politics → Technical issues: experts vs politicians

Neo-institutionalism (70s-90s) – R.O. Keohane, J Nye → 1973 oil crisis sparks a reaction to realism (relatively weak countries were able to inflict damage to great powers through oil → disconnection between power and military capabilities → failure of realism). Neo-institutionalists tried to find a scientific alternative to realism, basing their judgements on observation of international events.

Basic assumptions of Neo-institutionalism: 1-**International Anarchy** is the defining feature of international politics. The cause of instability is the absence of a world government. 2-**State Centricism:** IOs have some level of influence, but the state remains the key actor. 3-**Rational Behaviour of States.** States behave in an instrumentally rational way, choosing different theories based on their advantage.

→PARALLELISM BETWEEN KEY ASSUMPTIONS OF REALISM AND NEO-INSTITUTIONALISM

What are the differences between Realists and Neo-institutionalists?

-Neo-institutionalists reject the theory of continuity, believing in a progressive view of international politics. Technological progress, economic interdependence and the proliferation of IOs will change international politics.


-Neo-institutionalists believe in cooperation within international anarchy. State-centrism and rationality do not preclude the existence of cooperation between states. Because of the changes in international politics, states give more value to the role of international organizations as facilitators of international cooperation. → **International Organizations are the real game-changer.**

How do International Organization contribute to the cooperation between states?

IOs have five major benefits: 1- They improve the level of **Information and Communication** between states. 2-They offer more **opportunities of negotiation**, making it easier to solve disputes. 3-They give **credibility to commitments and sanctions**, thus states will respect them more. 4- They provide a **stabilization of expectations**: in a world where IOs are present, expectations will be higher. 5- **The 'reiteration of the game'**: prisoner dilemma – the more the game is repeated, the higher the chance that the players will cooperate. IOs act in such a way that 'the game is repeated' many times, increasing the degree of cooperation.

RESULTS: International organizations reduce the probability and opportunity of cheating, mistrust among states, uncertainty and the effects of the anarchic self-help system.

WHEN IOs MATTER? We can have 3 kinds of situations regarding states' interests:



MIXED INTERESTS SITUATIONS:

The 2 main kind of mixed interests situations are:

1) **problems of cooperation** → = the prisoner dilemma = in these situations for states the dominant strategy is not cooperate also if they can foresee that final outcome would not be beneficial (ex: cold war and disarmament → = common interests: reduce the nuclear armaments | | conflicting interests: preserving state's own security against the other superpower)

→ to solve that situations, IOs offer some important devices:

- Information
- Opportunities for (re)negotiation
- "Game reiteration"

2) **problems of coordination** → = the battle of sexes = a couple is deciding what to do on the weekend → they both have a common interest (spend the weekend together) but they have different preferences on what to do → transnational transports standards = states share the interest of sharing a common standard but they have conflicting ideas of what that international standard should be (each of them want it to be as similar as possible to their own)

→ to find a shared solution the following instruments offered by IOs have a crucial role:

- Stabilization of expectations
- Opportunities for negotiation (for an agreeable arrangement)
- Credibility of commitments and sanctions

● **Theory of interdependence (IR 16/02)**

- Assumptions

1-The declining role of the state → Erosion of sovereignty, blurring distinctions between domestic and external arenas, (transnational) civil society vs the state

2-Common problems and common solutions → Global and transnational challenges and the limits of nation states (ex. climate change; energetic resources; pandemics; terrorism)

3-Increasing equality among states → The diversification of power resources & the reduction of inequalities among states (ex Oil crisis 1973, Japan and the power of small countries)

● **Realism vs Complex interdependence**

The theory of complex interdependence is more confident in explaining international politics. Scholars Keohane and Nye build on realist arguments to develop their theory.

1- State-centrism for realists indicates the primacy of states as unitary and autonomous actors →. For the interdependence theory, states are part of a more complex situations. There are multiple actors, at different levels, which influence each other (civil society, transnational bonds).

2- For realists, Security is the dominant issue of foreign policy of states. There is a hierarchy of policies and security is at the top. → For K&N, different policy areas imply different priorities. In a complex, interdependent situation states are no longer subjected to a strict hierarchy. More equality= even smaller, weaker states can play an important role in international politics (ex. oil exporting countries).

3- In Realism, military capabilities is the primary source of power and influence and dominates all other issues. → For K&N, in the interdependent environment military power does not dominate every other issue. In some areas military power plays merely a marginal role, with some issues which are completely independent from military force (Ex. Climate Change agreements).

- **What is the impact of complex interdependence on world politics?**

- **The Crisis of Linkage strategies**

(Linkage strategy = classical realist argument stating that any concern/goal is ultimately related to security concerns). *Goals vary by issue areas → increasing variety of political bargaining by issue area → so that the problem of security no longer dominates other issue areas*

- **Agenda setting**

Multiple issues complicates the agenda →

Difficulty in elaborating a unitary and consistent national interest

- **Transnational and trans-governmental relations**

Increasing complexity of multiple-channelled relations →

Difficulty in elaborating a unitary and consistent national interest

- **International Organizations**

Proliferation of IOs as the result of the three previous dynamics →

Increasing international cooperation

REALISTS CRITIQUES TO THESE THEORIES → Realists claim that it is not true that states are no longer focusing on their security as their major issue and that they are no longer able to create a hierarchy of national goals (always with security on top) → moreover, regarding international collaboration, nation states choose to cooperate on very mild topics; on the other hand, regarding those issues that are sensitive for national security they are always thinking for their own interest. (example: price of oil after the Gulf War → why did these Arab states decided to maintain the oil prices under a certain standard (meeting the Western, and more specifically, American requests)? The USA military presence in the area)

Also, realists (that present themselves as an antidote to idealism) criticize the ideological aspect of neo-institutionalism → they see neo-institutionalism as based on an idealistic idea of liberalism (they see interdependence where there is really is only economic dependence and tend to picture the international arena as a cooperative world, when, in reality, it is not)

• **New Approaches to IR**

-**Approaches, not paradigms or theories**= they are not properly speaking theories (no assumptions, expectations, or theoretical propositions)

-Those approaches are **not properly framed in a 4th debate** → we have some overlapping between these approaches but there are not two opposing factions

- **Persistence of the old debates** (persistence of realist ideas + proliferation of new approaches). Even though realism has remained the most influencing theory in IR, these new approaches have been criticized on many sides: empirically, theoretically, and epistemologically, even by self-professed realists

LIBERAL THEORY OF IR	FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS
(Andrew Moravcsik)	(Richard Snyder; James Rosenau, Valerie Hudson) It first appeared in the late 50- 60s as a strand of IR and in the 90s it became an autonomous discipline trying to explain international events starting from domestic factors
Questioning state-centrism	Decision-making processes → IR theories are always starting from the outcomes of state decisions (they look at international phenomena starting from state decisions = they do not look “inside” states). On the other hand, foreign policy scholars look at the decision-making process behind those outcomes = that became their main object of analysis ↓
Individuals as the ultimate actors of IR. Individuals are united in macro-institutions representing them (the state) → under the state there really is a small number of political leaders	- Unpacking the black box of the state → = it is possible to explain international politics from <u>the factors affecting the decision-making process</u> behind foreign policy decisions
The international system is thus <u>the result of the aggregations of the decisions made within the states by some individuals</u>	Avoiding the abstraction of IR (vs Waltz and Neo-institutionalism, not willing to investigate “state black boxes”)
Given that individuals are the main actors of IR; <u>individual preferences</u> are preliminary to the structure → political leader are not just reacting to the dynamics of the system → in such way we are able to explain political CHANGE (ex: end of the Cold War, Gorbachev)	DOMESTIC BASED theories of international relations = IR theories are focused on international phenomena and variables (internationally based theories) while the goal of foreign policy analysis is to look within states in 3 ways: - looking at the foreign policy decision-making process within the state - unpacking the black box of the state - getting rid of the abstraction of neo-realism and neo-institutionalism (in favour of empirical research)

CRITIQUES AGAINST LIBERAL THEORY by realists:

- NOT a THEORY but just ANALYTICAL DESCRIPTION= saying that everything can be explained going back to the domestic preferences of some key actors can lead to a tautological reasoning → is that a theory or just an analytical description?
- There is no inner logic/mechanism at the general international level, just a suggestion that some international outcomes are motivated by some domestic factors → according to Waltz in particular, this is not a theory.

• Constructivism and Critical Theory – IR 21/02

-Constructivism and CT **challenge the whole positivistic system** - they move against old IR theories on an epistemological level.

- **Against (instrumental) rationality** → they reject the notion of rationality as it had been applied in social sciences and economic theories in the former 5-6 decades. Instead they are constructing the idea of *limited rationality* (Limited Rationality, Herbert Simon: questioning the fact that we really behave as completely rational actors - we are rational actors but we are rational within reality. We use a limited notion of rationality. Deviations from rationality is typical of individuals)
- **Questioning exogenous preferences** → IR theories assume the preferences of those perfectly rational actors (= exogenous preferences). Instead, constructivists argue that preferences are endogenous (they develop in the individual within the social context (through education, socialization, interactions...))
- **Reality & ideas** → Constructivism starting point is recognizing the fact that ideas and reality are intertwined and that social phenomena are social representations (of how we socially perceive them)

-Constructivism understands world politics as a social fact

→ «international relations are socially constructed» - they depend on social interactions and that we only have a perception of them.

Constructivism = mix of material factors (ex: military capabilities) and **immaterial factors** (ex: ideas, meaningfulness etc). Both affect states interactions → example: why are the US worried by North Korea nuclear capability and not by UK one (that is much higher than N. Korea one)?

- All notions of IR are **social constructs** (→ for this reason they are called “constructivists”)
- **Anarchy** (“Anarchy is what states make of it”, A. Wendt) → he claimed that international anarchy is out there (as there is no centralized international government) but the way in which we perceived this lack of world government is what makes us define it as “anarchy”, something threatening → it is not the lack of international government that dictate foreign policy, but the way in which states perceive it that does so → anarchy is a social construct (our perception of phenomena matter more than the reality of it)
- **Balance of power** → same as per anarchy. Our perception of the phenomenon matters more than the reality of it. Especially after the **peace of Utrecht** (1713 – End of the War of Spanish

Succession) the idea of balance of power has become an institution per se/ a value to be preserved → social construct.

CONSTRUCTIVISM RESEARCH PROJECTS:

- Research how **material and ideational structures interact**
- **Language** and attribution of meaning → how political leaders attribute specific meaning to specific threats/ phenomena through public discourse (why sometimes they seem to ignore real threats while overemphasizing others that are less incisive in reality)
- Investigating **ideologies and dominant ideas**
- Investigating the **epistemic communities** = communities in which ideas or ideologies are built (ex: universities, commissions...) and the way in which those can affect international policy and foreign decisions

All these research projects are INTERPRETATIVE analysis (not theories) → they rejected the idea that we can *explain* international relations

• **Critical Theory**

-Built around the ideas of the Frankfurt school.


→ **PARS DESTRUENS:**

- Criticizing **positivism & illuminism** → they reject positivism not only on an epistemological level (as constructivism did) but also on a political point of view (as the result of capitalistic society = it is based on a political ideology = not neutral way to investigate social phenomena)
- Criticizing the irrationality and **dysfunctionality of capitalism** and try to understand how people still believe that we live in the best society possible (that is liberal democracy)
- Problematizing the **relationship between the dominant scientific paradigm and the social conditions in which it is developed** → the experts that are formed in epistemic communities are too influenced by political ideas to be neutral actors

→ **PARS CONSTRUENS:**

- Unmasking the **cultural hegemony**
- **Rejecting IR dominant paradigms**
- Investigating **post-modernity** (crisis of modernity and liberal democracies in general) → they suggest the need to get rid of the IR ideas developed during the first 3 debates (those ideas were function to US power)
- Discovering **civil society** (against the state) → they think that the context in which we can really develop critical thinking and understand international policy is the civil society (not the state)

OTHERS:



• Democratic Peace Theory – IR 22/2

-Initially not a theory; the empirical observation came before → **It was observed that democracies tend to be more peaceful with one another** (late 80s). The Democratic Peace Theory was one of the dominant IR topics in the 90s, and is still discussed today.

-Key names: **Bruce Russett** (*Grasping the Democratic Peace*, 1994, manifesto of the Democratic Peace Theory); Zeev Maoz, Michael Doyle.

-**Another theory against the dominance of Realism** → Domestic factors matter, democracy can change power politics (and we have empirical proof of that).

• Key points

-**Democracies (almost) never go to war against each other. Why?**

→ Three reasons taken from Kant's *Perpetual Peace*:

1- **Structural causes**: Democratic regimes have a lot of constraints which prevent their leaders from going to war. Unlike dictators, democratic leaders worry about elections and popular opinion and for declaring war they need to find the necessary political support. → **Kant**: The people are the ones who fight wars. If you let them decide, they will choose not to go to war.

2- **Normative causes**: Democracies are more peaceful at the domestic level; citizens solve their disputes in a peaceful way → **regimes tend to export the ideals present in their domestic jurisdiction** in their foreign policies. A state's internal behaviour is reflected in its international behaviour → democracies are keener to solve international disputes in a peaceful way.

3- **Economic causes**: Economic interdependence (**Kant**: 'letting people travel freely to trade will create connections and prevent wars'). Liberal democracies have open markets and establish economic ties with each other → war becomes unprofitable.

- **Critiques of the Democratic Peace Theory**

-Are the statistics robust enough? Modern democracies are a relatively new type of government, so we have little empirical data. The democratic world order is just an exception in the history of the world.

-What types of democracies do not go to war. Democracy and war are two rare phenomena – in order to have a large statistical sample, it is necessary to expand the definition of democracy and admit some less democratic regimes.

-The exceptions are too relevant → (US and Spain in 1898/ UK, France and Germany in 1914/ Lebanon and Israel in 1948/ The American Civil War in 1861/...)

-Statistical data only refers to the Cold War period. During this period democracies were mostly part of the western block and allied with each other. The period of peace can be explained with the need to unite against a common enemy, not because of an inherent feature of democratic regimes.

- **Criticism by realist scholars**

-Democracies are as war-prone as any non-democratic regime.

-Democratic leaders act in an incoherent way → when dealing with non-democracies, they act cautiously and mistrustingly, and have a tendency to preserve their security. When taking part in international conferences they behave in the opposite way.

→ These reasons let us to believe that **the international behaviour of democracies and non-democracies is not different.**

-**Fallacy of the structural causes:** the checks on political leaders present in democratic states do not work in wars against non-democracies. (THE THEORY STATES THAT WARS BETWEEN DEMOCRACIES ARE RARE, NOT WARS BETWEEN DEMOCRACIES AND NON-DEMOCRACIES) → **Democracies are not generally more peaceful than other states.** (Waltz: 'This is why there is no theory')

-Is the public opinion always more peaceful than the government? No, in some cases it's the opposite.

-There is no empirical evidence that popular opinion makes leaders behave more peacefully. → (Ex. President Clinton launched the interventions in the Balkans just before his re-election to demonstrate that the US cares about avoiding HR violations → public approval).

-**Democracies do not wage interstate wars between each other.** However, interstate wars have seen a general decline in the last decades, both for democracies and non-democracies. → Democracies confront themselves in other ways (covert actions - military interventions by secret services)

• Contemporary International Politics – 23/02/2022

It is not easy to define the contemporary international system. Today's world presents many ambiguities which may be considered as the defining factor of modern day's world politics. → What are these ambiguities?

-Unipolarism vs Multipolarism → US hegemony vs emerging countries (BRICS). The Unipolar model became dominant after the collapse of the USSR and lasted for a brief period in the 90s, after which many regional powers started to emerge. (Do we live in a unipolar or multipolar world? Difficult to say, depends on the empirical aspects we analyse, experts cannot find a definitive answer).

-'The end of history' (Fukuyama) vs 'The Clash of Civilizations' (Huntington) → There is not a common view of international politics. We live in a post-(cold)war period → in history, after every major war the aftermath could be easily predicted by scholars. This does not happen in contemporary times. Experts are extremely divided on the type of future we can expect.

-The role of International Organizations → The last decades represented a period of decline for IOs. Many experts believed that the end of the CW would mean a new opportunity for the UN → The reason why the UN didn't work was the bipolarization of the world (idealist view). Meanwhile, realist scholars were much more sceptical on the role of the UN. They argued that many of the structures of the UN could work just because of the Cold War. Without the threat of the USSR, the western political system will lose cohesion (Realist were mostly right – the UN did not play a big role after CW)

-Decline vs persistence of states → Are states still the key actors? Some scholars believe that the state is now merely a formal structure. Nation states are no longer relevant for international politics. The social contract within states failed – citizens are no longer protected by the state from an economic POV (disappearance of welfare state). → Opposing view: states are still relevant, although they are no longer the key actors.

-Globalization vs Fragmentation → Do we live in a more globalized world? In the last decades travel and new means of communication shortened the distances between states. This means that the world of today is interconnected and interdependent more than anytime in history. → Criticism of this view: today's world is fragmented and lacks cohesion. (Example: covid → spread rapidly through the world, but states reacted differently).

-Peace vs War → We live in the longest-lasting period of peace in human history. At the same time, violence is still widespread (wars, terrorist attacks, ...). Do we live in a period of war or peace? Different views.

→ THERE IS NOT A COMMON VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY IN WHICH DIRECTION TODAY'S WORLD IS HEADED. MANY OPPOSING ASPECTS COEXIST.

This is unprecedented → In history, experts were more or less able to grasp the key aspects of their era. Never before so many ambiguities were present in Int politics.

The crisis of sovereign states → The centrality of nation states is undermined by many different factors (IOs, multinationals, complex interdependence, ...). States are more worried by non-state actors than other great powers (ex. 9/11 attacks). Through history, a competition between great powers was always a characterizing factor. Today, non-state organizations can represent a threat greater or equal,

even to the most powerful state (US). This results in a loss of confidence in the state by its subject → Hobbes: states are legitimate as long as it can protect its subjects. If this does not happen, the government is no longer legitimized to exist (*protecto ergo oblige*). This happens because the international environment is changing, thus jeopardizing the security of states.

Counter-argument: states are more relevant today than ever → States still represent the main source of protection. For the majority of individuals, states are still the only way to guarantee security. A world with states is still better than a stateless world.

On the other hand, states are a threat to the freedom of their citizens. Today, the ability to control a state's population is greater than ever. Now states have a real force affecting the personal lives of their citizens. This was unthinkable just some decades ago. (ex. lockdown → massive show of the state's strength). Crisis-management: states are the only way to manage great crises → ex. 2008 crisis – could be overcome only through massive state efforts.

Globalization vs Fragmentation: [Globalization is supported by liberal forces. → paradox: globalization is opposed to the right of self-determination]

Narrative of globalization: Greater opportunities, as a result of technological development. We live in a global village with a global civil society. Everything that is local is seen as obsolete → Sovereignism: globalization is not necessarily a force for good. We need to protect local traditions and values before they disappear.

Does technological development really help unite people? Social media are having a divisive effect on society. These new instruments at the same time unite and divide people → more opportunities for social relations, however they create alienation.

→ Diffusion of **regional studies**: study of specific geographic areas. Typical of contemporary IR – tells us that today's world is fragmented. (ex- study of the Middle East)

-Is the international Society turning into a global society? Many of the benefits of the European International Society are becoming global. However, many experts argue that the lack of an external presence is a problem for the development of a global society. Without something that creates opposition, a society lacks cohesion.

IR 28/2

- **Globalization and Fragmentation** – how do states react to globalization?

The actions and roles of states are not completely clear and understandable. It is not necessarily true that globalization means a decline in the role of the state. Some scholars argue that states today are more powerful than ever, even when compared to Absolutism. Power politics is more relevant today than ever.

→ Globalization is a process which does not necessarily imply the decline of states. States still hold relevant and powerful positions in the international stage (China vs the USA).

→ The role of technology: technological development seems to work exclusively in favour of globalization (better communications, more connections) but in reality it works both ways: the advancement in technology serves nation-states making them stronger and more powerful.

Globalization is not a sudden, impersonal process, but rather strictly connected with the actions of nation-states. Especially at the beginning, (Pre-WWI / Imperialism era) globalizing forces were driven by the economical interests of great powers. States are the driving force of globalization, not the victims. → **American hegemony made globalization possible.** The new world order which saw the US as the main superpower was the cradle of the process of globalization. The idea of an open global market in which all states may take place was greatly sponsored by the US.

-The first global international system

The period of the Cold War was the first truly globalized world system. In many ways, the bipolar international system was more globalized than today's world. → The two superpowers engaged in a global confrontation without precedents. Both had a global reach and had the scope of a global hegemony. The global ideological competition permeated in regional dynamics all over the world (Proxy [civil] wars). Every local war and geopolitical event saw the involvement of the two superpowers. **Never before the world was so interconnected.** The bipolar system of the Cold War was characterized by a great strategic interdependence. → **The relationship between US and USSR was a zero-sum game:** a victory for one side means a loss for the other. **Domino theory:** losing a state may mean the loss of many other states to the opposing side. **Reciprocal containment:** both powers tried to contain the other on the global stage.

-The post-cold war system

Difference between the **socio-economic** and **strategic-political** sides of globalization.

→ From a **socio-economic** point of view the post-bipolar world is more globalized than before. The disappearance of the Iron Curtain removed all obstacles from a truly global economic interdependence.

→ From a **strategic-political** point of view the Cold War system was more globalized than what came after. ("reversed globalization"). More political fragmentation, no clear opposing blocks. → **A unifying threat is no longer present.** Loss of cohesion of international organizations. **Reappearance of new regional complexes.** The world now is seen as divided in many regions (Middle East, Europe, East Asia, ...) → greater fragmentation. Regional studies within IR, not present during the Cold War era. Regionalization as a typical feature of today's world. **Renewed regional autonomy.** During the Cold War, global events influenced regional areas (top-down hierarchy). Global players shaped and constrained regional powers. Today the opposite of this is true. Regional dynamics influence the behaviour of superpowers. Lack of control over regional players. Return of the importance of geography (→this was abandoned during the Cold War. Ideological doctrines had no geographical boundaries. Superpowers had a global reach). Today, geographical proximity is again seen as relevant. Global players are no longer keen to intervene in regional conflicts. Regional powers can increase their influence without external interventions.

- **War and peace in the contemporary international arena (01/03)**

Obsolescence of major wars – war on large scale is doomed to disappear.

→ J. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday* (1989): warfare is like slavery and duels in the past. It is destined to disappear.

→M. Mandelbaum, *Is the Major War Obsolete?* (1998): revisitation of the theories of N. Angell – war is not convenient nor profitable.

→J. Sheehan, *Where have all the Soldiers Gone?* (2008): In XX century Europe, a shift happened in the conception of war and heroism. Values like glory and military pride are no longer relevant in the eyes of the greater public. Warfare is tolerated in some isolated cases, such as self defence and in necessary cases, but not for the pursuit of glory.

Counter-thesis: **warfare has changed, it has not disappeared**. Only the interstate form of warfare is disappearing, but organized violence still exists inside nations. Civil wars and revolts are still widespread today. Asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars* (1998): warfare has assumed new forms.

→**Irregular Warfare** is the common feature of wars in the last decades. Decline of the 'regular war': organized army, clear adversaries, uniformity, structure of command, organized fighting. This is closely tied to the decline of states as the key international actor. New non-state actors entered the stage of war (terrorist organizations). States no longer are in a monopolistic position, dictating who does and does not have the right to wage war.

Crisis of the *ius in Bello* – the appearance of new actors created difficulties in the application of humanitarian law. War is no longer fought exclusively in the battlefield. Are armed militias soldiers or civilians?

Crisis of the old forms of war: WW1/WW2 – ideology, discrimination, bombing of civilians to destroy the enemy's morale, **TOTAL WAR**: full civilian involvement; Cold War – Impossibility of an open confrontation, proxy wars, fading distinction between war and peace; Post-bipolar world – **wars without distinction** (private/public, civilian/military, inside/outside – civil war or international war?)

-War in the post-bipolar era

New actors can wage war → The hegemony of the superpower in the unipolar war incentivizes the conduct of an irregular war. Technological development and globalization made available new, cheap, effective weapons to non-state actors. Lowering for the threshold for war, previously only held by states.

End of reciprocity: these new wars are necessarily asymmetric. War is waged against less organized, less equipped, small size enemies. End of symmetrical, regular warfare. Great powers put almost nothing at stake vs small actors fighting for their survival (Afghanistan war). Wars are waged exclusively in the territory of the weaker side. Only the weaker side fully mobilizes. The experience of war is only felt by one side.

IR 02/3

• New wars after the end of the Cold War

Military Interventions rather than proper wars. Difference: wars are reciprocal, interventions are not. Interventions see the interference in the internal affairs of an independent state by another country. Interventions are forbidden under international law as they represent a violation of state sovereignty (UN Charter). → **HOWEVER**, in recent times they were justified as a mean of protection for human rights.

In general, the last 30 years saw the **decline of the principle of non-intervention**. This was caused by the rise of new security threats by non-state actors. These threats could only be confronted through military interventions against foreign countries. Great powers need to intervene for their own security. **Human rights vs state sovereignty** → Human rights are no longer considered as 'citizen rights'. Today human rights are seen as universal and belonging to the individual. They are not a concern of the single state, but something that transcends borders. **New conception of international security**: the focus is no longer on the states, but on the individuals.

- **1990s: The decade of hope**

-Collapse of the USSR, end of bipolarism, *New World Order* (George H.W. Bush). The 1990s were perceived as a decade of hope and optimism by IR scholars.

Iraq War (1991) – The *new order* starts with a police operation. This promoted a new use of military force as a way to punish states that don't follow IL. **New wave of democratization** → many former communist states became liberal democracies. Change in IR, great optimism, belief in peace. **Attempts at solving existing conflicts** (Ex. Israel-Palestine, Oslo Accords 1993). It was believed that without the conflict between the two superpowers (with veto powers), the UN Security Council could perform its duties and enforce peace. Great UN activism → increase in UN peacekeeping missions. **Crisis management** was practiced in order to avoid escalations (many failures, but some success ex Bosnia).

- **-The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina**

1992 → Collapse of Yugoslavia. Bosnia was split in many cultural groups (Serbs, Croats, Bosnians). A referendum was held in order to let the people decide for independence. This caused an escalation of violence which sparked a civil war.

How did the international community react to the civil war? → **CNN Effect**: the televising of the conflict increased awareness among the western population. This increased the support for a UN+NATO armed intervention, although against international law. This was labelled by scholars as a 'Democratic Intervention' because the scene was dominated by western democratic states, with democratic values (defence of Human Rights), and with the objective of democratizing the invaded country. → **Dayton Peace Agreement (1995)** – a model for international crisis management. The winning forces would help build the institutions for the creation of a democratic government in the occupied state. UN peacekeeping forces would remain stationed in Bosnia for the years following the war. This was a success and the Dayton model was applied in other states in the following years (Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya).

Dayton model: Military Intervention → Peacekeeping → State-building.

- **The Kosovo case – IR 7 Mar**

1999 → Kosovo is an Albanian-majority region of Serbia. Starting from the early 90s, the government started restricting the rights of Albanian-speaking citizens. This caused an escalation of violence and **ethnic cleansing** operations were carried out by both sides. In 1999 NATO decided to intervene to preserve the peace, in the same way they did in Bosnia. In August 1999 a peace was signed and peacekeeping NATO forces remained in the region (and still are today). The state was completely run by the UN.

The UN Security Council did not approve the intervention. However, it was considered an 'illegal but legitimate' operation as it was aimed at preserving human rights → FIRST REAL CASE OF HUMANITARIAN WAR. For the first time the intervention was aimed at a functioning sovereign state, not a failed one (Somalia, Bosnia). The targets of bombings were not only military but also political (Belgrade), in order to undermine the authority of the state. The Security council did not approve the intervention but it legitimized it. → **BIRTH OF THE 'RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT' (R2P)**

2001 → International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS): its goal was to square the circle between state sovereignty vs international interventions. The scholars which formed the commission agreed to recognize the R2P as a legitimate international response to a humanitarian crisis. The doctrine recognizes state sovereignty as long as they guarantee the rights of their populations. If a state is unwilling or unable to protect its population, the responsibility falls on the international community, which is justified to intervene in the country's internal affairs. → **Sovereignty is a conditional state right.**

The backbone of the R2P doctrine is the **Just War Tradition** → What makes a war just? **Just cause** (the motivation of the war must be legitimate), **Right intention** (The intervening states' intentions must be to protect human rights, not their own interests), **Last resort** (every non-violent option must be explored before the war), **Proportional means** (Military force must be used in proportional and reasonable means), **Reasonable prospects** [of success] (the war must be winnable – it is useless to intervene if the operation concludes in a failure), **Right authority** (The war must be sanctioned and approved by the right political authority – the United Nations).

IR 8/03 – The Case of Libya

- **The intervention in Libya is considered an example of the R2P in practice.**

-Why did NATO intervene in Libya? → In 2011 the Arab Spring arrived in Libya. The people started rebelling against the regime of Muammar al-Gaddafi and the area of Benghazi fell in rebel hands. Gaddafi mobilized the army and before the troops could arrive in Benghazi the UK and France decided to intervene with American support (op. *Odyssey Dawn*). The *operation* was later transformed in a NATO intervention (*Unified Protector*) with the support of the members of the alliance (the US had a secondary role).

Initially, the NATO objective was the protection of civilians, but the goal of the war quickly shifted towards a regime change in the country. In October a peace was signed and the regime was overthrown. **This was considered a success of the R2P doctrine**, and many scholars (included the Secretary General of the UN) considered it a handbook case of how the R2P should work.

→ WHY?

1-The international community was able to quickly intervene and stop the atrocity crimes in the country. This helped prevent a humanitarian crisis.

2- The UN quickly responded and in a matter of weeks the Security Council approved two resolutions (UNSC resolution 1970 and 1973). The latter contained the first reference to the R2P. This set the basis for the NATO intervention.

3- The operation was a military success. The NATO forces were able to coordinate and effectively plan the offensive.

- **Aftermath of the war.**

A retrospective analysis of the war suggested that the intervention had endangered the doctrine of R2P instead of strengthening it.

→ WHY?

-**The UNSC Resolution 1973 was the first and last official mention of the R2P.** Some countries (especially China and Russia) feared that the R2P would become an excuse to further western countries' interests. Those countries declared they would never approve a resolution with a mention to the R2P in the future.

-**The situation in Libya was reduced to a false dichotomy** between the Tyrant and the innocent victims. That was not the case. The rebels were armed from the beginning of the conflict, contrary to what was portrayed by western media. This simplification is to some extent present in all cases of humanitarian war. Experts analysed the conflict and concluded that the Libyan army used force in a proportionate way (90% of the victims were males → violence was not used indiscriminately).

-**The debate about which civilians should be protected in Libya** → The R2P should be neutral and protect all civilians indistinctively. During the war, NATO forces bombed retreating troops and administrative buildings. These actions were not strictly necessary to the protection of civilians from the regime. Furthermore, in the last weeks of the war NATO bombed hundreds of civilians during the siege of Sirte. **This is not how the R2P is supposed to work.** All civilians must be protected, not only those on one side.

-**After the war NATO forces abandoned the country** leaving Libya to its fate. No peacekeeping force was deployed → the responsibility to rebuild and create a stable government was ignored. **'Death' of the Dayton model.**

IR 9/03 – The case of Afghanistan

- **The end of the 'Humanitarian Decade' (2001-2011)**

-The **9/11 terrorist attacks** showed the vulnerability of the West. **Security came back to be at the forefront of international politics** (*Global War on Terror* – George W. Bush). The unipolar system showed its weaknesses → large spread of anti-American sentiment. The international legal order centred around the US was challenged.

-**The 2008 global financial crisis** showed that the international liberal system was not as secure and prosperous as it was thought to be.

-**2011 – The Breaking point.** This year is seen as a watershed because of the many events that took place:

1-The US retreated from Iraq, resulting in the first American military defeat after the end of the Cold War.

2-The intervention in Libya and its subsequent abandonment challenged the doctrine of the R2P.

3-The war in Afghanistan reached a turning point, NATO forces started to struggle.

4-ISIS started its rise following the power vacuum left by NATO in Iraq.

- **The war in Afghanistan**

We can divide the war in four phases: **2001-2002** – Operation *Enduring Freedom* and the ‘light footprint’; **2003-2008** – NATO-ISAF and the multilateral engagement; **2009-2014** – Obama administration, the *Af-Pak Strategy*; **2015-2021** – The years of disengagement, reduction of military presence, Afghanistanization of the conflict, negotiation with the Taliban, the withdrawal.

-The first phase (2001-2002)

The US launched operation *Enduring Freedom* in October 2001 following the 9/11 attacks. A coalition of states led by the US deployed a light military presence in Afghanistan. The operation was under a UN mandate and saw the participation of many NATO countries, but it was not a NATO mission → this way the American Army had more room of manoeuvre.

‘Afghan model’= The US identified a common ally against the Taliban (the ‘Northern Alliance’, composed by many ethnic minorities hostile to the Taliban regime) and gave them support in their war. This allowed a lighter force to be deployed → the war was NOT AN INVASION. One month after the US involvement the army of the Northern Alliance entered Kabul and the Taliban government fell.

The goal of the war was to destroy the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, NOT peacekeeping and state-building. The US had no plans for democratization. In 2001 a peace conference was held in Bonn → it was decided that a NATO mandate would serve peacekeeping purposes in Afghanistan (ISAF – International Security Assistance Force). Dayton model.

-The second phase (2003-2008)

In 2003 the US invaded Iraq → withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, ISAF would carry on the peacekeeping mission. In 2004 NATO took control of ISAF and started peacefully expanding in the east (originally ISAF controlled only Kabul and the surrounding areas).

In 2004-2006 ISAF started expanding in the south towards the border with Pakistan → in that region Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces were still present. The resistance forces launched a full-scale insurgency against the NATO troops → the operation changed from peacekeeping to a state of war. Some NATO countries were opposed to the change in nature of the operation.

-The third phase (2009-2014)

2008→ Barack Obama is president. The American public opinion is aware of the situation in Afghanistan so one of Obama’s main concerns is to avoid a full military defeat. **Change in strategy**→ The Af-Pak Strategy.

The US started focusing on Pakistan, the main source of support for Taliban forces. A great diplomatic pressure was applied to make Pakistan increase anti-terrorist action especially in the regions bordering Afghanistan. The American army withdrew from Iraq → *The Surge*: 100.000 American troops were sent to Afghanistan. Obama promised the war to be over and all troops to be withdrawn by 2014.

-The fourth phase (2015-2021)

As promised, Obama slowly retreated all forces from the country and the war turned even more in favour of the Taliban. Operation *Enduring Freedom* was concluded in 2015. New light missions were sent (operation *Freedom Sentinel* → NATO-ISAF became NATO *Resolute Support*). NATO troops were

reduced in number from 150.000 to 15.000. Training and support to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Despite this the Taliban kept advancing.

In 2016 Donald Trump became president and changed strategy for Afghanistan. His intentions were to withdraw American soldiers from the country (despite this he sent a new force of 3000 men).

Negotiation with the Taliban took place, in order to find an agreement and allow the withdrawal of NATO troops. 29/02/2020→ US-Taliban Deal.

In August 2021 President Biden announced the complete withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan (not a sudden decision but the end of a long process).

- **What went wrong in Afghanistan?**

1- **There was a confusion between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.** Who was the real enemy? The Taliban offered protection to the terrorists but they were not the same thing → the Taliban were not involved in the 9/11 attacks. Al-Qaeda was a global terrorist organization while the Taliban were mainly focused on Afghanistan. The two parties were also in conflict with one another, but the US did not take advantage of this.

2- **The ideological dimension of the Global War on Terror.** Bush considered Al-Qaeda a global menace when in reality they were mostly based in Afghanistan and in low numbers. This devalued the war in Afghanistan and expanded the conflict to other states (Syria/Iraq). 2002→ 'Axis of Evil' speech: all terrorists are American enemies, the US will fight back. All countries hosting terrorists are enemies of the US. Division of the globe into American allies and terrorist countries. **Because of the ideological side of the conflict, the Bush administration overlooked many potential opportunities:** Iran, for example, had a long story of conflict with the Taliban but it was labelled as a terrorist state. Furthermore, all efforts went into counter-terrorism without any investment or nation-building in the occupied states.

3- **Operation Enduring Freedom was not suppressed** and kept fighting when peacekeeping forces were present in the country at the same time. Contradictory presence → are we here for peace or war? In many cases Enduring Freedom troops endangered the situation of peace in the country. Furthermore, this made it harder to gain the support of the local population → no regard for the social consequences of the war.

4- **The strategic shift:** NATO troops were trained for purposes of peacekeeping. In a matter of months, they were asked to fight a full-scale war without proper training.

5- **NATO countries were tired of war.** In that situation it is hard to organize and deploy an adequate military force, especially considered the ambitious goals of the conflict (defeat the terrorists, keep the peace, install a democracy). The political will of the fighting countries was not sufficient.

The Islamic State – IR 14/03

- **Origins of ISIS**

- **Abu Musab al-Zarqawi** (The 'man' of al-Qaeda in Iraq) - He was operative in Iraq after the 2003 war, organizing the insurgency against US troops. In 2003-2006 he started a sectarian war against Shiites:

Sunni jihadists were particularly interested in the “purification of the Islamic world”. While international troops fought against insurgents, insurgents were internally divided.

-January 2006 – Birth of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) → at first it appeared as a movement within Al-Qaeda.

-2006-2010 – The first crisis: al-Zarqawi was killed by American troops. Furthermore, the birth of the ISI saw little attention in jihadist social media networks. In those years Osama Bin Laden was still considered to be the real leader of the jihadist movement. **The divergences between al-Qaeda and the ISI started growing** for two reasons: 1) Al-Qaeda did not agree on the need of purifying the Islamic world (his main goal was fighting the infidels, while Al-Zarqawi’s priority was to fight the Shiites as that was a necessity in order to be able to fight the infidels) 2) ISI was behaving too autonomously

-2011 – The turning point

→ **Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi** became the new leader of ISI, that started the re-organization of the movement to recruit loyal militants. Starting to draw a distinction between ISI and the Al-Qaeda organization. The final goal of his reorganization was the creation of a real state (with its own administration, territory, and population). Every territory set free from the western invasion was put under the administration of ISI → that was a problem for Al-Qaeda as the long-run goal of the organization was to create a universal caliphate

→ **US departure from Iraq.** Renovation of the movement and new campaign against both the Americans and the Shiites

→ **al-Maliki** was the filo-American president at the time the US left Iraq. He was a Shiite and started to adopt some sectarian policies that favoured Shiites. The resentment this created within the Sunni population favoured the popularity of ISI.

→ The **Syrian civil war** was seen as an opportunity to expand the Islamic State by taking advantage of the Syrian state failure

-2013 - al-Baghdadi decided to rename the movement ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). ISIS become an autonomous movement, leaving Al-Qaeda definitely (Al-Qaeda leader wanted to keep the war scenarios of Iraq and Syria separated, while al-Baghdadi considered crucial to keep them together, also for the Sunni community living across the border). ISIS was behaving as a modern state and wanted to have the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in its own territory → contrasting with Al-Qaeda operations.

-2014 - ISIS conquered Mosul (Iraq). Consequences:

- 1) Boost of ISIS credibility
- 2) OIL → Mosul was a key node for oil pipelines; ISIS militants were able take control of them and sell oil on the black market
- 3) Mosul is the seat of the central bank of Iraq → money
- 4) ISIS militants managed to confiscate weapons to the Iraqi military forces (artillery, vehicles...)

Thanks to these new money influxes ISIS started to act as a proper state, delivering services (free food for poor people, public transportation, a sort of public health system...)

→ After a few months, **Al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself as the new Caliph (IS)** → officially recreating the caliphate. ISIS was renamed to **IS (Islamic state)** → no distinction between Iraq and Syria, now part of the same caliphate)

-US reaction: the US feared that the conquer of Mosul could be only the first stem to the conquest of Iraq (just 3 years after their departure). That was not true, Al-Baghdadi wanted to stop the territorial expansion to consolidate IS presence in the territories already conquered. The US reacted immediately with **“Operation Inherent Resolve”** = international mission led by the US that was able to avoid a further enlargement of IS. The mission was successful and the IS was defeated in Mosul (July 2017) & Raqqa (October 2017 – Raqqa was perceived as the capital of the caliphate).

-October 2019 - Death of al-Baghdadi. The Islamic State lost its territory. Some bases are still operative in Syria and Iraq, but they are not in control of significant portions of territory → The IS still exist but is now a non-state actor.

- **IS and the paradoxes of contemporary world politics**

A) globalization & fragmentation

- **GLOBALIZATION** = IS was perceived as a global threat to the US-led global order and, more in general, world order (built around liberal values)
 - IS global dimension was not only related to its identity, but it was global also at the operative level = Muslim jihadist were all connected or moved by the war IS was fighting (what was, spatially speaking, a regional war; actually connected Muslim jihadist fighters all around the globe).
 - Also the communication strategy adopted by IS was mirroring western communication: importance of social media and internet used as propaganda mediums
- **FRAGMENTATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST**

B) Crisis & persistence of state

- **IMPORTANCE OF THE STATE** = the fact of being and functioning as a state was a key factor for the success of the Islamic State against Al-Qaeda and other non-state actors
- **CRISIS OF THE STATE** = on the other hand IS was established taking advantage of state failures (first Iraq, then Syria).

C) The uncertainties of unipolarism

- What concrete consequences did the 2011 defeat have on the US? No one (asymmetrical interests of the war). A few years after that they managed to defeat the Islamic State. (loss then victory). The regional dynamics of Syria and the IS “forced” the US to change their mind and go back only 3 years later their departure. The regional dimension was governing the US agenda.
- A world order devoid of expectations: there are not clear expectations on the world order. Are we still in a unipolar world? Should the unipolar state be reacting to local dynamics or controlling them)