

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Making and breaking govts: semi-presidential democracies

105) Government

-A semi-presidential democracy is one in which the gov depends on a legislative majority and on an independently elected president to exist

-There are two types of semi-presidential democracy, both of which have “**legislative responsibility**”:

a) **premier-presidential**: president has no power to remove the gov (no “presidential responsibility”); for example, Ireland

b) **president-parliamentary**: president can remove the gov (the president is much more powerful in these systems); for example, France

106) Semi-presidential regimes

-Is the government responsible to the president?

a) if no, then the regime is parliamentary

b) if yes, then the regime is semi-presidential (assuming legislative responsibility)

-**Presidential responsibility** refers to the ability of the president to dismiss the government and individual ministers (Portugal) or to dissolve the legislature (France)

107) Government

-The government comprises a prime minister and a cabinet

-In a semi-presidential democracy, the executive branch comprises the government and the president → **the president is part of the executive branch but not part of the government**

108) Cohabitation

-There is no guarantee that the president and the prime minister will come from the same political party

-**Cohabitation** means to have a president from one political bloc and a prime minister from another → it is a bit problematic bc of the principle of legislative responsibility (the gov is both responsible to the president and to a legislative majority)

109)

-The president nearly always gets to appoint the prime minister. So, why do we get cohabitation?

-Remember that the gov must enjoy the support of a legislative majority

-Therefore, **the president may need to appoint a prime minister from an opposition party when the president's party does not have a legislative majority**

110) Gov formation

-There are not many studies of gov formation in semi-presidential democracies

-One recent study suggests that the gov formation process is a cross between that in parliamentary democracies and that in presidential democracies

a) when the **president's party controls a legislative majority**, it looks like a **parliamentary democracy**

b) when the **president's party does not control a legislative majority**, it looks like a **parliamentary democracy**

-Other studies suggest that once we take into account rules concerning dissolution, govts in president-parliamentary systems are just as stable as parliamentary govts

111) Delegation problems (also called theory of delegation)

-We can view all democracies as different systems of delegation

-**Delegation** occurs when one person or group, called **principal**, relies on another person or group, called **agent**, to act on the principal's behalf. For example, patients (principals) delegate medical issues to doctors (agents) → the patient relies on the doctor

-**Delegation is crucial for representative democracy bc essentially you delegate power to someone else, who must be accountable to you**

LOOK SLIDES 111-119

112) In **figure 12.10**, you can see the process of delegation: the median voter chooses the representatives, by delegating them, who in turn delegate the Prime Minister and Cabinet in the gov, and then they appoint the ministries, who in turn delegate the function to implement policies to the civil servants

113) In **slide 113**, you can see that the American Senate plays an important role in the sense that the members of the gov are appointed by the President, but they have to be confirmed by the Senate, while the House of Representatives simply delegates civil servants

114) Delegation problems

-Delegation offers a number of potential advantages for the principal:

a) benefit from the expertise of others (you can rely on the expert of something)

b) reduce personal costs and effort

-However, there are also a number of principal-agent, or delegation problems → **agency loss**: it is a loss that you experience as a result of the fact that you delegate functions to another actor (it might happen that the person that you delegate does not actually agree with you for some points)

115) In **slide 115**, you can see a principal delegating an agent, who share the same preferences (3); the principal's region of acceptability, which means that you, as principal, are happy with that, (given that the status quo is 5) would include all those policies between 1 and 5

118) Delegation problems

-The power of the agent in the principal-agent relationship is not unconditional

-If principals don't have all the information, then two problems arise (which might cause agency loss):

a) **adverse selection**: principal can't observe whether agent has the right preferences or skills

b) **moral hazard**: principal doesn't have complete information about the agent's actions

119) Delegation problems

-Principals can use two mechanisms to gain information about the agents:

a) **ex ante mechanisms**: before the agent acts → it involves two types: **screening** (sets up competition among candidates for the agent position); **selection** (agents are put into a position to choose an action that reveals information about their 'types')

b) **ex post mechanisms**: after the agent acts → it involves two types: **police patrol system** (principals directly and actively monitor the agent's actions); **fire alarm system** (principal relies on others' information about agent's performance, for example the Court of Auditors is an organization that controls in this way the budget spending of the state)

CHAPTER 13: ELECTIONS AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

3) Classifying democracies

-Democracies are sometimes classified in terms of the electoral system that they employ

-An electoral system is a set of laws that regulate electoral competition between candidates or parties or both

4) LOOK SLIDES

5) LOOK SLIDES

6) Electoral systems

-Political scientists typically distinguish between electoral systems are based on the electoral formula that they employ: majoritarian, proportional, mixed

-An **electoral formula** is determines how votes are translated into seats

7) LOOK SLIDES

8) Majoritarian electoral systems

-A majoritarian electoral system is one in which the candidates or parties that receive the most votes win

9) SMDP systems

-A **single-member district plurality system** is one in which individuals cast a single vote for a candidate in a single-member district (it means that the territory is divided among districts, which number is equivalent to the number of seats, therefore only one seat can be won in one district). The candidate with the most votes wins (for example, UK)

-**Criticisms**: a candidate can win without an absolute majority of the vote (you can win with 10% of the votes if the others all get 9%); it produces unrepresentative outcomes; it encourages strategic

voting (you might be encouraged to vote not for your first best option, but for your second best option, bc he has more chance to win the seat)

10) LOOK SLIDES (you can see that Bagshaw won without absolute majority)

11) Alternative vote

-The alternative vote is a system of preferential voting (for example, Australia)

-**Preferential voting** involves voters ranking one or more candidates or parties in order of preference on the ballots (for example, if there are 5 candidates, you rank them from the first to the last)

12) Alternative vote

-A candidate who receives an absolute majority is elected

-If no candidate wins an absolute majority, then the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and her votes are reallocated until one candidate has an absolute majority of the valid votes remaining

LOOK SLIDES 13-22

23) Two-Round systems

-A two-round system has the **potential for two rounds of elections** (which does not mean necessarily that there will be two rounds)

-Candidates or parties are automatically elected in the first round if they obtain a specified level of votes, typically an absolute majority

-If no candidate or party wins this level of votes, then a second round of elections takes place

-Those candidates or parties that win the most votes in the second round are elected

24) Two-round systems

-There are two types of two-round systems: 1) majority-runoff two-round system; 2) majority-plurality two-round system

25) Majority-runoff two-round system:

-They are candidate centered systems in single-member districts in which voters have a single vote

-Any candidate who obtains an absolute majority of votes in the first round is automatically elected

-If no candidate obtains an absolute majority of votes, then the **top two vote winners** go on to compete in a runoff election

-Whoever wins the most votes (a majority) in the second round is elected (for example, French presidential elections)

26) Majority-Plurality two-round system:

-They are candidate-centered systems in single-member districts in which voters have a single vote

-Any candidate who obtains an absolute majority of votes in the first round is automatically elected

-If no candidate obtains an absolute majority of votes, then **all candidates that overcome some preordained threshold of votes** can compete in the second round

-Whoever wins the most votes in the second round is elected (for example, French legislative elections)

27) LOOK SLIDES

28) Single Nontransferable vote

-It is a system in which voters cast a single candidate-centered vote in a **multi-member district** (which means that in your district more than one candidate can obtain seat)

-The candidates with the highest number of votes are elected (for example, if there are 3 seats to be assigned in one district, then the top 3 candidates will obtain seat) (for example, Japan until 1996)

29) Single Nontransferable vote

-Disadvantages of this system: weakens parties and encourages factionalization; encourages clientelistic behavior and the development of patronage systems; favors both incumbent and well-organized parties; few incentives to build broad-based coalitions

30) Block vote

-The block vote is a candidate-centered system used in multi-member in which voters have as many votes as there are candidates to be elected

-The **candidates** with the most votes win (for example, Kuwait)

31) Party block vote

-The party block vote is used in multimember districts in which voters cast a single party-centered vote for their party of choice

-The **party** with the most votes wins all of the districts seats (for example, Singapore)

\The difference is that in the block vote you choose the candidate, while in the party block vote you choose the party\

32) Proportional electoral systems

-A proportional electoral system is a quota- or divisor-based electoral system employed in multimember districts

-The rationale behind PR system is to **produce a proportional translation of votes into seats**

-Proportional electoral systems can be divided into those that use party lists and those that do not

33) List PR

-In a list PR system, **each party presents a list of candidates** for a multimember district

-Parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the votes (if a party gets 20% of the votes, then it will get 20% of the seats)

-These seats are then shared among candidates on the list in various ways

34) List PR

-List PR system differ in important ways:

- a) the precise formula used to allocate seats to parties
- b) the district magnitude
- c) the use of electoral thresholds
- d) the type of party list employed

35) Electoral formulas: Quotas and Divisors

-All PR systems either employ quotas or divisors to determine how many seats each party wins

-In the quota systems, the quota indicates the number of votes that guarantees to a party a seat in a particular electoral district (essentially, **a quota is the number of votes that are necessary to get one seat**)

36) Electoral formulas: Quotas

-**Hare quota**: you divide the number of valid votes by the number of seats

-**Droop quota**: you divide the number of valid votes by the number of seats+1

-There are many other ways

LOOK SLIDES 37-41 (with the highest average remainders, you divide the number of total votes (47.000) per the number of automatic seats (4))

42) Electoral formulas: Divisors

-All PR systems either employ quotas or divisors to determine how many seats each party wins

-A divisor system **divides the total number of votes won by each party in a district by a series of numbers (divisors) to obtain quotients**

-District seats are then allocated according to which parties have the highest quotients

LOOK SLIDES 43-44-45 (In **slide 44**, you give the seats according to the quotients, for example party A will get 5 seats bc it has 5 quotients) (In **slide 45**, you see that within the common idea of proportionality, some of them are more proportional than others)

46) District magnitude

-However, the key variable for determining the proportionality of an electoral system is the **district magnitude**

-The district magnitude is **the number of representatives elected in a district**

-The larger the district magnitude, the greater the degree of proportionality

47) District magnitude

-Although all PR systems use multimember districts, the average size of these districts can vary quite a lot (for example, in the Netherlands and Slovakia, there is only one district and the average district magnitude is 150, while in Chile the average district magnitude is 2)

48) Electoral thresholds

-All proportional systems have an electoral threshold that represents the **minimum percentage of votes that a party must win to gain seat**

-This threshold can be **formal**, which means that party needs to get above that percentage to get one vote (and it is written in the electoral vote), or **natural**, which means that it exists as a mathematical property of the electoral system

-The higher the threshold, the less proportional the system is

49) Electoral threshold

-**Natural threshold** (since there is only one district in the Netherlands, the natural threshold is 0,67% of the votes, that is 100% divided by 150 seats)

-**Formal or legal threshold** (Germany requires that parties win 5% of the national vote or at least three constituency seats to be eligible to receive votes; Turkey has 10% threshold, while Poland has 5% threshold for parties and 8% threshold for coalitions)

-Formal threshold are often introduced in an **attempt to reduce legislative fragmentation** (in order not to have too many different views represented that might provoke intransitivity and instability)

51) Electoral threshold

-**Side-effects of threshold** (in the Turkish legislative elections of 2002, so many parties failed to overcome the 10% threshold that fully 46% of all votes cast in these elections were wasted)

52) Types of party list

-In a **closed party list**, the order of candidates elected is determined by the party itself, and voters are not able to express a preference for a particular candidate (more power to the party, less to the candidates)

-In an **open party list**, voters indicate not just their preferred party but also their preferred candidate within that party (more power to the candidates)

-In a **free party list**, voters have multiple votes that they can allocate either within a single party list or across different party lines

LOOK SLIDES 53-58+ LOOK APPUNTI PUBLIC LAW

59) Types of party list

-Countries with closed list systems have high levels of party discipline

-Countries with open list systems have relatively low levels of party discipline

60) Single transferable vote

-It is the **only proportional system that does not employ a party list**

-The single transferable vote is a preferential **candidate-centered PR system** used in multimember districts (the single non transferable vote is majoritarian)

-Candidates that overcome a specified quota of first-preference votes are immediately elected. In successive counts, votes from eliminated candidates and surplus votes from elected candidates are reallocated to the remaining candidates until all the seats are filled (it seems similar to the alternative vote, but the alternative vote is majoritarian) (example, Ireland)

LOOK SLIDES 61-62-63

64) Mixed electoral systems

-It is a system in which **voters elect representatives through both systems, majoritarian and proportional**

-The mixed system employs the so-called **electoral tier**, that is a level at which votes are translated into seats (the lowest electoral tier is the district level; electoral tiers are typically at regional or national level)

-Many mixed electoral systems have multiple electoral tiers, with majoritarian formulas used in a lower tier and proportional formulas used in a higher tier

66) Mixed electoral systems

-There are two types of mixed electoral systems:

a) an **independent mixed system** is one in which the application of one electoral formula does not depend on the outcome produced by the other (in other words, the two formulas are not linked to each other)

b) A **dependent mixed system** is one in which the application of one electoral formula is dependent on the distribution of seats or votes produced by the majoritarian formula → in these systems, the proportional component of the electoral system is used to compensate for any disproportionality produced by the majoritarian formula at the constituency level (this one is clearly more proportional)

-In most dependent mixed systems, **individuals have two votes**: one for the candidate and one for the party

LOOK SLIDES 67 E 70

71) Mixed electoral systems

-Two issues come up with dependent mixed systems:

a) some candidates compete for constituency seats but are placed on the party list

b) some parties win more constituency seats than it is justified by their party list vote

-This leads to **overhang seats**, that is seats that are given in order to produce proportionality

LOOK SLIDES 72-76 (In slide 76, you can see that majoritarian systems are much more preferred in Not free and Partially free countries bc they can be easily manipulated)

\Single-member plurality district sometimes (for example in elections in dictatorships) is preferred to List PR bc it can be more easily manipulated\

CHAPTER 14: SOCIAL CLEAVAGES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

3) Political parties

-A **political party** can be thought of as a group of people that includes those who hold office and those who help them to get and remain in office

-Political parties serve four main purpose:

- a) **they structure political world**, which means essentially that they simplify the political world (for example, the existence of left and right parties is useful to simplify the political world)
- b) **they recruit and socialize the political elite**, which means essentially that they take and train people who want to enter the political world
- c) **they mobilize the masses**, which means essentially to involve people in the political issues
- d) **they provide a link between the rulers and the ruled**, that is between the political elite and the masses

5) Party systems:

-Political scientists often categorize democracies in terms of the type of party system that they exhibit (they typically distinguish between party systems based on the number and size of the parties that they contain):

- a) **a nonpartisan democracy** is a democracy with no official political parties (very very rare)
- b) **a single-party system** is one in which only one political party is legally allowed to hold power (clearly not a democratic system)
- c) **a one-party dominant system** is one in which multiple parties may legally operate but in which only one particular party has a realistic chance of gaining power
- d) **a two-party system** is one in which only two major political parties have a realistic chance of gaining power
- e) **a multiparty system** is one in which more than two parties have a realistic chance of gaining power

8) Counting parties:

-Political scientists do not typically count every party that exists to avoid "**joke**" parties (for example, the Monster Raving Loony Party in the UK is a party composed by one single individual)

-It should be better to count the **effective number of parties**, by using a measure that weights the number of parties by the share of votes or seats they get (in other words, a party that is large is counted more than a party that is very small)

-**Some examples:**

- a) a party system where there are two parties that each win 50% of the votes has two effective parties (two-party system)
- b) a party system where there are five parties that each win 20% of the votes has five effective parties (five-party system)

c) a party system where there are five parties, where two win 45,5% each and the other three win 3% each has 2.45 effective parties (it cannot be really considered a five-party system like the one before, it is actually more similar to a two-party system)

-You have to consider a) the effective number of electoral parties and b) the effective number of legislative parties

a) **Effective number of electoral parties**: these are parties that win votes (parties that participate in the election)

b) **Effective number of legislative parties**: these are parties that win seats (parties that win in the election and take part in the Parliament in Italy, for instance)

11) Party systems:

-Why are some systems divided primarily along ethnic lines, while others are divided mainly along class, religious, linguistic or regional ones?

-Why do some systems have many parties and others have few?

LOOK SLIDES 12-13

14) Types of parties:

-One of the roles of parties is to represent particular groups in societies → they represent **social cleavages**:

a) **urban-rural cleavage** (after the process of industrialization, there has been a division between the urban and the rural population)

b) **confessional cleavage**

c) **secular-clerical cleavage** (starting from the beginning of the 19th century especially in Europe, there has been a division between the State and the Church)

d) **class cleavage** (starting especially with the mass industrialization, with the emergence of the socialist party)

e) **post-materialist cleavage** (starting especially with the emergence of the Green Parties)

f) **ethnic and linguistic cleavages** (particularly evident in Africa, which is an ethnic divided country and in Belgium, which is a linguistic divided country)

-There are also new recent social cleavages in Europe:

a) populist cleavage (left)

b) nativist cleavage (right)

-But why do we see these cleavages? We need to use the so-called **identity formation**, which is a theory that explains how political identities are formed

17) Politicized cleavages:

-Individuals are multifaceted and are characterized by a set of **attributes**, such as religion, language, class, gender, skin color and so on, that makes them eligible for membership in some identity category

-Attributes generate different values

-An **identity category** is a social group in which and individual can place himself, and identity categories are socially constructed

LOOK SLIDES 18-19-20-21

-How attributes map into actual identity categories is likely to depend on the **distribution** (how many other French speakers there are) and **correlation** (for example, how many French speakers are southerners)

-A country with uncorrelated attributes has **cross-cutting attributes** (which means essentially that if you see someone speaking French, you do not know whether he comes from the north or the south)

-A country with correlated attributes has **reinforcing attributes** (which means essentially that if you see something speaking French, you immediately think that he comes from the south)

LOOK SLIDE 23 (it means that it is likely that four identity categories will emerge representing those four cleavages)

LOOK SLIDE 24 (it means that it is likely that two identity categories will emerge representing two cleavages)

→as a result, we would expect more identity categories to emerge with cross-cutting attributes

25) Politicized cleavages

-**Electoral rules** can influence which cleavages become politicized

-Recall the logic of least minimal winning coalitions from our discussion of the gov formation process

LOOK SLIDES 26-27-28-29 (In **slide 26**, you see that what makes a difference is precisely the different electoral rules of the two countries considered (50% against 60%), therefore according to the least MWC, you (as French north) will form in country A coalition with the Dutch north, while in country B a coalition with the French south)

(In **slide 27**, you see the different cleavages that can be formed as a consequence of the different electoral rules)

(In **slide 29**, you see that also the distribution of cleavages matter → **it is interaction between the distribution of cleavages and the electoral rules**)

31) Question

-When and why are some cultural differences perceived as politically and socially salient and others not?

-When does a cultural difference matter and when is it ignored?

-We examine the relationship between two different ethnic groups, Chewas and Tumbukas, in Malawi and Zambia (**ethnic cleavage**)

32) Chewas and Tumbukas

-2/3 of Chewas and Tumbukas live on the Malawi side of the border, while 1/3 live on the Zambia side

-Chewas and Tumbukas have objective cultural differences

-However, in Malawi, the Chewas and Tumbukas are arch political enemies, while in Zambia they are political allies

-They looked at four villages that are separated by the Zambia-Malawi border (therefore there are not a lot of differences among those four groups → **the only things that differ among those four groups is the ethnic composition of the group and the fact that it belongs to Zambia or to Malawi**)

LOOK SLIDE 34 (they are arch enemies on the right, while they cooperate on the left → in other words, on the right side the ethnic cleavage is activated, while on the left side the regional cleavage is activated)

-There are recognizable cultural differences between Chewas and Tumbukas, in fact they are distinct ethnic groups

36)

-As we have said, Chewas and Tumbukas are political allies in Zambia, but enemies in Malawi → therefore the question analyzed is:

-Would a member of your ethnic group vote for a presidential candidate from the other ethnic group?

a) 21% said no in Zambia

b) 61% said no in Malawi

-Would you marry a member from the other ethnic group?

a) 24% said no in Zambia

b) 55% said no in Malawi

37)

-Why are Chewa-Tumbuka relations so different in Zambia and Malawi? Considering that

a) both employ SMDP systems

b) both have had one-party rule and multi-party rule

c) both are British colonies

-So, can't be these reasons

38) Malawi

-Chewas (57%) and Tumbukas (12%)

-They are relatively large groups that can be used to win power

-In SMDP (where you do not strict 50% to get into office), **it does not make sense for the Chewas to make a coalition with the Tumbukas (it does make sense to politicize the Chewa-Tumbuka dimension)**

- Malawi Congress Party is seen as the Chewa Party
- Alliance for Democracy is seen as the Tumbuka Party

39) Zambia

- Chewas (7%) and Tumbukas (4%)
- They are relatively small groups that are not good political vehicles
- Here, **it does make sense to form a coalition, otherwise you will never have the chance to get into office (it does not make sense to politicize the Chewa-Tumbuka dimension)**
- Therefore, in Zambia the division is between the Easterners (Chewas AND Tumbukas), Westerners, Southerners and Northerners
- This is bc Chewas and Tumbukas have to work together if they hope to win political power

40)

- The story of Chewas and Tumbukas in Malawi and Zambia supports our view of identity formation**
 - a) the logic of political competition focuses voters' attention on some cleavages rather than others
 - b) politicians seek to build winning political coalitions
 - c) if these political coalitions are going to emphasize cultural or ethnic divisions, then political leaders will choose divisions that define the most useful sized building blocs
 - d) not all cultural and ethnic divisions will become politicized

LOOK SLIDE 41

42) Number of parties

- Why do some systems have many parties and others have few?

-Duverger's Theory:

- a) Social divisions (cleavages) are the primary driving force behind the formation of parties
- b) Electoral institutions influence how those social divisions are translated into political parties

-**The more social cleavages there are in a country and the more that these cleavages are cross-cutting, the greater the demand for distinctive representation and the greater the demand for political parties**

LOOK SLIDES 44-45 (we would expect more political parties in slide 44 (where potentially you have 8 political parties) than in slide 45 (where potentially you have 4 political parties))

46) Electoral institutions

-Social cleavages create the demand for political parties, but **electoral institutions** determine whether this **latent** demand for representation actually leads to the existence of new parties

-Specifically, **non-proportional electoral systems** act as a **brake** on the tendency for social cleavages to be translated into new parties (bc in majoritarian system, you need often to cooperate to get into office) → for two reasons:

a) **mechanical** effect of the electoral laws (mathematical reason)

b) **strategic** effect of electoral laws

48) Mechanical effect

-The mechanical effect of the electoral laws refer to the way votes are translated into seats

-When electoral systems are disproportional, the mechanical effect punishes small parties and rewards large parties

LOOK SLIDES 49-50-51-52-53 (if you think strategically, as a Green in SMDP, you will vote for your second best party, not for the Greens)

54) Strategic effect

-The strategic effect of electoral laws refers to how the way in which votes are translated into seats influences the '**strategic**' behaviors of voters and political elites

-When electoral systems are disproportional, their mechanical effect can be expected to reward large parties and to punish small parties

-As a result, voters have an incentive to engage in **strategic voting** and political elites have an incentive to engage in **strategic entry**

-The strategic voting essentially means voting for your most preferred **candidate who has a realistic chance of winning**

-The strategic entry refers to the decision by political elites about whether to enter the political scene under the label of their most preferred party or under the bale of their most preferred **party that has a realistic chance of winning** (it refers for example to the action taken by Renzi or Calenda)

LOOK SLIDES 56-57-58 (some Labour would strategically vote for Liberal Democrat)

59) Strategic entry

-Imagine that you are an aspiring political entrepreneur in Duvergerland who has an interest in **environmental politics**

-You know that the **Green Party** probably comes closest to sharing your policy preferences, but you know that **you will not get elected** given the use of SMDP electoral system

-Therefore, you have to consider whether you can better further your policy agenda by running with the Green Party or **running with a different party**

60)

-In contrast to political elites who compete under SMDP electoral rules, political entrepreneurs in **proportional systems do not face this strong trade-off** → this is bc even a small amount of electoral success in gaining votes can often allow you to win legislative seats

-Moreover, small parties can be in the enviable position of being the kingmaker in the gov formation process in these systems

61)

-Disproportional electoral systems mean that small parties are less likely to attract high-quality candidates and other resources (which means essentially that politicians who really want to implement their policies are more likely to join other larger parties)

-They also mean that small parties are less likely to be formed in the first place

62) A strategic entry game

-There are two left-wing parties (L1 and L2) and one right-wing party (R)

-If both left-wing parties compete in the election, then the right-wing party will win for sure

-If only one left-wing party runs, then the right-wing party will lose

-The worst possible outcome for the left-wing parties is if the right-wing party wins (0)

-The best possible outcome for each left-wing party is if they win (1)

-The second best outcome for each left-wing party is if the other left-wing party wins ($\#$, where $0 < \# < 1$)

LOOK SLIDE 64-65-66

-The more disproportional the electoral system, the greater the incentive for small parties to merge or to form coalitions (if the system was completely proportional, then they would not have the incentive to merge bc all the parties will have their own percentage of seats)

67) Duverger's theory

-Duverger's theory states that the size of a country's party system depends on the complex interplay of both social and institutional factors (**LOOK AT THE THEORY ABOVE**)

→social divisions create the 'demand' for political parties and electoral institutions then determine the extent to which this demand is translated into parties that win votes (electoral parties) and parties that win seats (legislative parties)

In other words

-When there are many cross-cutting cleavages, there are many distinct positions that need to be represented

→whether these distinct positions are ultimately translated into distinct parties will depend on the proportionality of the electoral system

69)

-**Disproportional electoral systems** discourage the formation and electoral success of new parties in two related ways:

a) first, the **mechanical effect** of these systems leaves small parties with fewer seats in the legislature than the votes cast for them would have produced in a PR system

b) second, the **strategic effect** of these systems leaves small parties with fewer votes than the latent support for their policies in the electorate would suggest they could attract

LOOK SLIDES 70-77 (In **slide 70**, you can see that electoral institutions alter the extent to which social cleavages will become politicized, then the strategic effect of electoral laws intervenes in the formation of electoral parties (the strategic entry), and then the mechanical effect intervenes in the formation of the legislative parties) (In **slide 71**, you see that you will have many parties only if there is high social heterogeneity and if there is a proportional system) (In **slide 73**, if all the systems were completely and totally proportional, then all the points would be along the line) (In **slide 74-75-76**, you can see the very relevant difference between majoritarian and proportional systems that it exercises of social cleavages, in terms of the extent to which they tend to be represented or not) (In **slide 77**, district magnitude (1) means that it is majoritarian, while district magnitude (120 to 150) means that it is proportional)

\What is crucial according to the Duverger's Theory (and in order to understand this chapter) is the **interaction between social cleavages and electoral institutions**\

CHAPTER 15: INSTITUTIONAL VETO PLAYERS

3) Federalism

-Scholars differ over when a country can be considered a federal country; in this regard it is useful to consider a conceptual distinction between

- a) **de jure federalism**, that is federalism in **structure**
- b) **de facto federalism**, that is federalism in **practice**, with the idea of decentralization

4) Federalism in structure

-A **federal state** is one in which sovereignty is constitutionally split between at least two territorial levels so that independent governmental units at each level have final authority in at least one policy realm ('constitutionally' means that it must be written in the Constitution that it is a federal state)

-States that are not federal are known as **unitary states** (and in the world the majority of states is unitary, not federal)

8) Devolution

-**Devolution** occurs when a unitary state grants powers to subnational governments but retains the right to unilaterally recall or reshape those powers (therefore it is not federalism)

→the political power still resides in the national government in unitary state, which means that the national government simply concedes more autonomy to the regional governments (but they do not have a constitutional right to any of their powers)

LOOK SLIDES 9-10-11

12) Federalism

-Federal systems can be congruent or incongruent

- a) **Congruent federalism** exists when the territorial units of a federal state share a similar demographic makeup with one another and the country as a whole (the US is an example of

congruent federalism bc more or less they are similar in terms of how they represent the nationwide population)

b) **Incongruent federalism** exists when the demographic makeup of territorial units differs among the units and the country as a whole (Switzerland or Belgium are examples of incongruent federalism bc they speak different languages, different cultures...)

-Federal systems can be symmetric or asymmetric

a) **Symmetric federalism** exists when the territorial units of a federal state possess equal powers relative to the central government (US)

b) **Asymmetric federalism** exists when some territorial units enjoy more extensive powers than others relative to the central government (Canada, where Quebec has more power than other federal units across the country)

14) Federalism in practice (it is all about decentralization)

-**Decentralization** refers to the extent to which actual policymaking power lies with the central or regional governments in a country

→ most political scientists see decentralization as a revenue issue: the greater the share of all tax revenues going to the central government, the less decentralized is the state

LOOK SLIDE 16 (In **figure 15.1**, you can see that to have a decentralized government does not immediately mean that it is a federal state in practice; for example, Denmark and Sweden are unitary states, and Belgium is a federal state, however Denmark and Sweden are less centralized than Belgium)

18) Why federalism?

-In terms of historical process, there are two types of federalism:

a) **Coming-together federalism** is the result of a bargaining process in which previously sovereign polities voluntarily agree to give up part of their sovereignty in order to pool together their resources and improve their collective security or achieve other economic goals

b) **Holding-together federalism** is the result of a process in which the central government of a polity chooses to decentralize its power to subnational governments in order to diffuse secessionist pressures

-**Advantages of federalism**

a) it creates a closer match between policy and citizen preferences

b) it brings the government closer to the people and therefore it increases government accountability

c) it creates incentive for good government performance due to competition among states for citizens and investments (for example, in the US there are states in which you pay less taxes than in other states)

d) it encourages policy experimentation

e) it creates a bulwark (a wall) against tyranny by providing increased checks and balances (it prevents the risk to have too much power concentrated on the executive)

-Disadvantages of federalism

- a) it can lead to the unnecessary duplication of government and the inefficient overlapping of potentially contradictory policies
- b) it exacerbates collective action problems in the formulation and implementation of policies (which means that sometimes they might not care about what happens in the national policies and they care only about their own policies)
- c) competition between states can have deleterious consequences such as “downward harmonization” in which levels of regulation, welfare and trade barriers are continuously lowered (in the sense that the competition between states can lead to lower standards of regulations, etc...)
- d) competition between states can also lead to the amplification of preexisting inequalities, particularly if there is asymmetric federalism
- e) it facilitates blame shifting and credit claiming, thereby lowering government accountability (for example, in Italy we have seen the government blaming Lombardy for how they dealt with the pandemic situation)

21) Bicameralism (it refers to how legislature is organized)

-A **unicameral legislature** is one in which legislative deliberation occurs in a single assembly

-A **bicameral legislature** is one in which legislative deliberation occurs in two distinct assemblies (in Italy, Senate and House of Representatives)

22) Bicameral systems can be congruent or incongruent

a) **Congruent bicameralism** occurs when the two legislative chambers have a similar political composition (for example, Italy has usually a congruent bicameralism)

b) **Incongruent bicameralism** occurs when the two legislative chambers differ in their political composition (for example, France has usually an incongruent bicameralism)

23) Congruence or incongruence

-Whether bicameralism is congruent or incongruent depends on a) **how** the membership of the two chambers is **selected** and b) **whom** that membership is supposed to **represent**

→When the same methods are used to elect the members of each chamber and both chambers represent the same set of citizens, then the political composition of the two chambers is likely to be congruent

→when this is the case, the policy preferences and opinions of the two chambers will be similar

-When it comes to electing bicameral legislatures, it is almost always the case that **members of the lower chamber are directly elected**

→In contrast, there are four common methods to select **members of the upper chamber**:

- a) Hereditary (like the House of Lords)
- b) Appointment (like if they are appointed by the Prime Minister or by the President)
- c) Indirect elections (if they are elected by local authorities)

d) Direct elections (by the population, like it happens in Italy)

-In almost all countries, members of the **lower legislative chamber** are supposed to represent all **citizens** equally

→ however, this is rarely the case for members of the upper legislative chamber

→ by far the most common role for the **upper chamber** is to represent the citizens of **subnational geographic units**

→ this is always the case in federal countries (US, Germany, Mexico) but it is also the case in some unitary countries (Bolivia, Netherlands, Spain)

-Since the upper chamber represents subnational geographic units, it might be the case that the representation of the citizens within those units is different from one unit to another

→ this concept is called **malapportionment** which occurs when the distribution of political representation between constituencies is not based on the size of each constituency's population (for example, California is represented in the Senate by two Senators, and New Hampshire is represented by two Senators as well, even though the size of the population is completely different)

→ as a result, in a malapportioned system, the votes of some citizens weigh more than the votes of others

LOOK SLIDE 27 (what it means is that 10% of the American population is represented by 39.7% of seats, which is clearly malapportioned; in contrast, Belgium is not malapportioned bc 10% of the population is represented by 10.8% of seats, and so on)

28) Bicameral systems can be symmetric or asymmetric

a) **Symmetric bicameralism** occurs when the two legislative chambers have equal or near equal constitutional power (for example, Italy)

b) **Asymmetric bicameralism** occurs when the two legislative chambers have unequal constitutional power (for example, France)

LOOK SLIDE 29 ('**weak bicameralism**' bc the two chambers have equal power, but they have the same policy preferences, therefore it does not really matter the bicameral system; '**strong bicameralism**' bc the two chambers have equal power, but they have different policy preferences, and it is in this situation that the bicameral system really makes a difference; '**weak bicameralism in the case of France**' is bc of the fact that the two chambers have different constitutional powers; '**insignificant bicameralism**' bc the two chambers have different policy preferences and different constitutional powers, therefore the chamber with less power will be irrelevant)

30) Why bicameralism?

-Bicameralism can find its origins in the concept of **mixed government** outlined in ancient Greece

→ mixed government referred to the idea of having different institutions representing the interests of different social classes

→ by creating a system of checks and balances, mixed government was supposed to prevent one social class from dominating all of the others

31)

-The first bicameral legislature in a modern sense appeared in 14th century England

→this systems mirrored the Ancient Greek notion of mixed government:

- a) The lower house represented the democratic element of society
- b) The upper house represented the aristocratic element of society
- c) The king's veto represented the monarchic element

32)

-Historically, bicameralism meant the separate representation of social classes in different legislative bodies

-This view of bicameralism began to change in the 18th century with **the rise of republicanism** and its emphasis on the representation of the people as a whole rather than as a set of competing social classes (American and French Revolutions)

33)

-Rather than as a mean to represent different social classes, bicameralism increasingly came to be seen as a mean that federal states could use to **represent their constituent territorial units**

→the lower chamber would represent the popular dimension of the people's will and the upper chamber would represent its territorial dimension

→this was justified on the idea that the **different states were likely to have specific and distinct needs from the population as a whole**

34)

-Some unitary countries have retained a bicameral structure

-In most cases, though, the power of the upper chamber has been significantly reduced (like in France)

→the argument for keeping these weak upper chambers is based on the idea that their members have characteristics of value (age, wisdom, and knowledge) that members of the lower chamber do not

→in many countries, this incongruence is achieved by having appointed upper chambers in which members are selected on the basis of special skill or expertise

35)

-In **federal countries**, bicameralism is adopted mainly to protect and promote the distinct preferences of the different territorial units

-In **unitary countries**, bicameralism is adopted mainly to improve the quality of legislation

36) Constitutionalism

-Another way in which political scientists distinguish between states is by the extent to which they accept constitutionalism

→ **constitutionalism** refers to the commitment of governments to accept the legitimacy of, and therefore be governed by, a set of authoritative rules and principles established in a document called **Constitution**

→ there must be a system of **constitutional justice**, which comprises the set of institutions and procedures that are established to protect constitutional rules and principles (in other words, the constitutional rules and procedures must be enforced, otherwise the Constitution remains just as a piece of paper)

37)

-Historically, few countries have had any system of constitutional justice (it is actually a pretty recent idea)

→ instead, the historical norm has been **legislative supremacy** (rather than constitutionalism)

→ the norm of legislative supremacy states that laws created by the people's representatives in the legislature should not be constrained by other authorities such as the Constitution (in other words, in history if there was legislative majority in the Parliament, then that legislative majority had legislative supremacy, therefore could pass laws whenever it wanted)

38)

-Today, the norm of legislative supremacy has been replaced by the concept called "**new constitutionalism**"

→ new constitutionalism describes a situation in which almost all countries now have an entrenched constitution, a bill of rights, and a procedure of constitutional review to protect rights

39)

-A constitution provides the formal source of state authority. In addition to establishing the structure, procedures, powers, and duties of government institutions, more recent constitutions also contain a list of guaranteed rights

→ a **codified constitution** is one that is written in a single document (Italy)

→ an **uncodified constitution** is one that has several sources, which may be written or unwritten (UK)

40)

-An **entrenched constitution** is one that can be modified only through a special procedure of constitutional amendment (like a popular referendum, or a qualified majority)

-An **unentrenched constitution** has no special amendment procedure and can be modified at any point in time with the support of a legislative majority (in other words, you can modify the Constitution with the same procedure according to which you can modify an ordinary law)

41)

-Historically, we can identify two ideal types of constitutions:

a) the **legislative supremacy constitution** has no constitutional review, has no bill of rights and is not entrenched

b) the **higher law constitution** has constitutional review, has a bill of rights and is entrenched

42)

-When we are in the second type, we must consider the **constitutional review**, which is the authority of an institution to invalidate legislation, administrative decisions, judicial rulings and other acts of government that violate constitutional rules, such as rights (in other words, it is the authority to declare whether decisions taken by public bodies are constitutional or not, that is whether it is in line with the Constitution or not)

→ constitutional review can be exercised by judges sitting on special tribunals, called **constitutional courts**, that are not part of the judicial system (very common in **Europe**), or by **ordinary judges** from the regular judicial system (**American** system)

→ when constitutional review is conducted by ordinary judges from the regular judicial system, it is commonly referred to as **judicial review**

LOOK SLIDE 43

44)

-There has been a shift towards higher law constitutions since **1945**

→ the shift was partly a response to the experience with fascism in the period between WWI and WWII

→ the subsequent adoption of higher law constitutions has coincided with **democratic transitions**

→ in almost all cases, the adoption of higher law constitutions can be viewed as an attempt to prevent repetition of the individual abuses inflicted by the state in the past (in other words, **to limit the excessive power used by the state against individuals in the past**)

45)

-Despite the adoption of higher law constitutions, countries have adopted slightly different systems of constitutional justice:

a) type of constitutional review

b) timing of constitutional review

c) jurisdiction of constitutional review

46) Type of constitutional review

a) **abstract constitutional review** involves the constitutional review of legislation in the absence of a concrete legal case (there is no need of a specific legal case to raise a question of constitutional review)

b) **concrete constitutional review** involves the constitutional review of legislation with respect to a specific legal case (it is impossible to raise a question of constitutional review without a specific legal case)

47) Timing of constitutional review

a) **a priori constitutional review** occurs before a law is formally enacted, that is before the law enters into force (clearly connected to abstract constitutional review)

b) a **posteriori constitutional review** occurs only after a law is formally enacted, that is after the law enters into force

48) Jurisdiction of constitutional review

a) **centralized constitutional review** refers to a situation in which only one court can conduct constitutional review (European model)

b) **decentralized constitutional review** refers to a situation in which more than one court can interpret the constitution (US model)

LOOK SLIDES 49-50-51 (In **slide 49**, you see that if the constitutional review is concrete, then it cannot be a priori) (**STUDY WELL SLIDE 50**)

52) Veto player theory

-Veto player theory offers a way to think about political institutions in a consistent way across countries

→ in effect, veto player theory conceptualizes the institutional structure of a country in terms of its configuration of veto players

→ a veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary for a change in the political status quo (which means essentially that the necessary condition for a policy to be modified is the approval of a veto player)

a) An **institutional veto player** is generated by a country's constitution (for example, if the constitution establishes that in order to pass a law you need the approval of both Chambers, then it means that there are two institutional veto players)

b) A **partisan veto player** is generated by the way the political game is played (for example, if there is a two-party coalition government, you have two partisan veto players)

53)

-Rather than view federalism, bicameralism and constitutionalism as entirely different institutions, we can consider them as just different types of the same thing: as different types of institutional veto players

→ an important implication is that **the number of veto players tells us about the capability of political actors to modify the status quo** (if there are many veto players, it is going to be harder to modify the status quo)

54)

-Veto player theory indicates that countries in which there are many veto players with **conflicting policy preferences** (crucial, bc if they all agree, then they would just modify the status quo) are likely to be characterized by:

a) greater policy stability (greater difficulties in modifying policies)

b) smaller policy shifts

c) less variation in the size of policy shifts (which means essentially that, if there are political reforms, they are likely to be small)

4) weaker agenda-setter powers (for example, in the US the Congress is the agenda-setter, with the power to propose a bill, and the President is the veto player, with the power to veto a legislation adopted by the Congress)

55)

-Two central concepts in veto player theory are the notion of an indifference curve and the notion of a winset

a) **an indifference curve** is a set of points in the political space such that an individual is indifferent between any two points in the set (which means that you as an individual are indifferent between those combinations)

b) **the winset of the status quo** is the set of alternatives that can defeat the status quo point

→in the context of veto player theory, the winset of the status quo is **the set of alternatives that ALL veto players prefer to the status quo**

→these are the points that fall within the indifference circles of every veto player

LOOK SLIDE 56 (In **slide 56**, you see that there is a situation in which there two issues, one regarding economy and one regarding education, and you can easily identify the status quo; there are three actors (A, B, C) who each has its ideal point and each has also its indifference curve with respect of the status quo (they are at the center of the indifference curve); the small petal close to the status quo represents the winset of the status quo, which means that it is the set of policies that each player (A, B, C) would prefer to the status quo, bc for all of them would be closer to their ideal point)

57)

-**The size of the winset has a significant impact on policy outcomes**, and is strictly connected to the 4 points: policy stability, size of policy shifts, variance in the size of policy shifts, agenda-setting power

a) **policy stability (the probability of modification of the status quo)**

→when the winset is small, policy stability is high bc there are just few policy alternatives that can defeat the status quo

→when the winset is large, policy stability is low bc there are many alternatives that can defeat the status quo

b) **size of policy shifts (the size of the modification of the status quo)**

→when the winset is small, policy shifts must necessarily be small; it is impossible to move policy far from the status quo

→when the winset is large, the possibility arises for more radical shifts in policy

c) **variance in the size of policy shifts**

→when the winset is small, policy shifts are always small

→when the winset is large, policy shifts may be large or small; the variance in the size of policy shifts is larger

d) agenda-setting power

→ when the winset is small, the agenda setter cannot move policy far from where the other veto players want to move it if they were the agenda setter

→ when the winset is large, agenda setting becomes more important bc the agenda setter has the possibility to move policy far from where the other veto players would move it if they were agenda setter

61)

-How does the size of the winset depend on the number of veto players and the ideological distance between them?

→ veto player theory shows that an increase in the number of veto players decreases the size of the winset or leaves it the same, but for sure it never increases the size of the winset

LOOK SLIDES 62-67 (In slide 63, you see that if you increase a third actor, the size of the winset becomes smaller, which in turn has relative implications on the 4 points discussed above) (In slide 64, you see that it is not just the number of veto players that matters, but also the ideological preferences of the actors involved matters) (An important point is that if you move from slide 64 to slide 63, you see that the fact that actor B enters the scene does not make a relevant difference bc the size of the winset has not changed)

65)

-How does the size of the winset depend on the number of veto players and the ideological distance between them?

→ veto player theory shows that an increasing in the ideological distance between veto players always shrinks the size of the winset

68)

-The size of the winset in any particular situation is determined jointly by the number of veto players and the ideological distance between them

-In general, the size of the winset shrinks with increases in the number of veto players and the ideological distance between them (in general bc it may be the case that you increase the number of veto players, but it does not make a difference)

69)

-Federalism, bicameralism and constitutionalism can be reconceptualized in terms of veto player theory

→ countries with these types of institutions should be characterized by a) policy stability, b) small policy shifts, c) little variation in the size of policy shifts, d) weak agenda-setter powers