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NEW FUNCTIONALISM – Haas, Lindberg, Schmitter

A) Historical context

Post-WWII, late 50s – early 70s

The 1950s witness a rapid process of European integration, that starts with coal and steel and ends up with the establishment of a common market.

- An attempt to theorize the strategies of the founding elites of Post war European unity.
- Monnet and Schuman rejected the idealism of the federalist movement, the grand design in favour of an incremental and low profile strategy.
- Gradual and progressive entangling of national economies starting with coal and steel which at the time represented basic elements of industrial production.
- Political unity would be the ultimate consequence of economy enmeshment. But this required the establishment of supra-national institutions specifically aimed at guiding and pushing forward the integration process.

The main neofunctionalists were actually American political scientist that were looking at what was happening in Europe during the 50s, but they were also influenced by the main political sciences approach prevalent in the US (scientific context); in fact, political science is a discipline that mainly developed in the US.

Two main figures: Jean Monnet and Schuman.

American scholars were trying to interpret what Jean Monnet and Schuman were actually doing: it is an attempt to explain what was going on in history at the time.

The first institutional step in the integration process was setting up the Coal and Steel Community. In 55 it is not just coal and steel Community, but the whole economies of these countries (customs union), so there was an acceleration of the process of economic unification (common external border with common fees).

There would have never been an integration in Europe if there wasn't an industrial society that needed a broader area to sell its products. Thus a precondition of integration is the presence of an industrial economy in Europe. This is in line with behaviouralism.

Political unity would be the ultimate consequence of economy enmeshment. But this required the establishment of supranational institutions specifically aimed at guiding and pushing forward the integration process. → Supranational institutions as repositories of knowledge.

B) Scientific context

It is difficult to understand neofunctionalism without addressing the fact that it was developed in the US within a very specific academic context, which is the behavioural revolution; it is a major criticism of the previous approach that was focused on institutional approaches.

Neofunctionalism investigates the supranational level by resorting to the same theoretical bases used to analyse the national polity.

- Purposeful actors pursuing their own interests in a plural context.
- No idealistic pursue of common good

- Competition between different groups will influence the decision-making process as a result.
- All of political institutions are overshadowed.
- Policy represents the result of conflicting forces and their negotiations.
- Satisfaction of welfare and national needs drives the political process.
- Ideology is still with us. But it manifests itself in religious, ethnic and educational policy confrontations rather than in the realm of the economy or the large issues of defence and foreign policy → At the time, defence and foreign policy were outside the scope of EEC, as NATO dealt with these issues.
- Policymaking becomes increasingly technocratic, both at the national and supranational level.

Behaviouralism is a political science theory developed in the US. It implies the understanding of politics and political dynamics not by looking at institutions but looking at the world which is made of pluralist political interests. There are many social groups, each pushing for its own interests.

Pluralist theory of democracy - Dahl

Politics is the result of the interaction between interest groups and society. What is decided at the political level is simply the result of the pressures that emerges at the societal level from different interest groups interacting with each other. Therefore, politicians and institutions basically reflect the balance of forces present in societies.

Political decisions in a sector are reflecting the societal forces in that given sector, so institutions are not crucial elements. This was the dominant scientific approach in American political science of the time.

It was reflected at the EU level with a focus on interest groups and economic forces within societies, as they are the ones that are mainly pushing for integration. They are not limited to their national territories, and national government are not exercising a gatekeeping role: societal forces are ready to organize at a supranational level if it is convenient for them, and not to be limited by national governments.

Neofunctionalism builds on these theories of pluralism and behaviouralism.

Behavioural revolution

- Critical analysis of actual political process in contrast to institutional and constitutional approaches (that were dominant before) to understand what is going on in politics.
- To understand real political processes, it is necessary to look at how society is organized and the interactions between social groups.
- Scientific approach: hypothesis to be empirically tested
- Pluralism in political science → Political decisions as results of political interaction between interest groups
- Government as the administration of things

As a managerial process: politicians are just people who know which are the best decisions to take, and it is easier to find these managers at the supranational level → End of ideology

- Neofunctionalism investigates the supranational level by resorting to the same theoretical bases used by behavioural theory to study the national polity → Pragmatic vision that does not deal with ideals, unlike federalism (cooperate to guarantee peace)

It is not possible to understand EU integration unless considering that Europe is an industrial society. The driving forces of integration is not a grand design of ideals and federations, but rather it has to do with interests of cooperation and social groups that at that point of time were relevant in Europe. This approach downplays the role of political institutions and formal aspects of political systems in favour of societal forces (needs of an industrial society and corporations). Their interests were to have a broader geographical area in which to sell their goods. These national interests cannot be kept inside national borders: if they are willing to organize at the supranational level, they will find a way to do so. They would easily shift their loyalties from a national government to the supranational level.

DRIVING FORCES OF INTEGRATION → There are two elements: national economic interest groups and bureaucracies operating at the supranational level (Commission), that once are established will push for further integration.

TECHNOCRATIC VIEW: government of things → Alliance between economic interests at the national level and bureaucratic interests at the supranational level. It reflects a view of society in which ideologies are not so important anymore.

Of course the process will have to start with a government agreeing to take part in this supranational level, but once the process has been set in motion, it will largely go ahead on the bases of the pressure exerted by economic interests and bureaucracies.

In fact, a large part of services that are public in Europe, are not in the US (railways): to get functions to be dealt with at the national level, it is necessary to prove the need to do so for the government to ask money, while in the EU it is the contrary.

Dahl → Pluralist vision of the society and political system, rather than the same people taking decisions in all the fields. It is at the basis of the neo-functional theory.

How is it that these interests managed to keep this collaboration, expanding the scope of the integration process? In fact, it also was faster than expected: the customs union was supposed to be completed in 10 years, while it only took 8 years.

The simple reason is that these economic elites supported this process because they were getting benefits out of it. Thus, they would rather organize themselves at the supranational level, shifting their loyalties and moving competences from the national to the supranational level, which was able to provide better benefits.

C) Basic Assumptions

- Industrial, pluralist, and bureaucratic societies
- Groups will shift loyalties towards the supranational level in order to pursue their interests.
- To better pursue their interests, groups will set up transnational organizations. Business groups and trade unions did very soon develop supranational associations.

The process of community formation is dominated by nationally constituted groups with specific interests and aims, willing and able to adjust their aspirations by turning to supranational means when this course seems profitable (Haas).

- Politics at the supranational level will be characterized by groups direct access to supranational level institutions → It is not only national governments that play a role, but also interests groups will directly try to influence policy-making
- According to this perspective, national governments are no longer able to exert their gatekeeping role. The process will start with the signature of a treaty, but what comes after is the result of pressures.
- Discontinuity with respect to traditional patterns of international interaction. While intergovernmentalism is linked to the international relations theory of realism, neofunctionalism was linked with pluralist approaches to policymaking at the national level (economic interests), whose same categories are used to analyse the EC.

The engine of EU integration is basically the satisfaction of material needs and it fits well with the idea of the end of ideologies, in favour of practical issues.

Even Schuman rejected the idealism of the federalist movement, claiming that solidarity would just come out gradually through a low-profile process.

At a certain point in time, integration will move from being strictly economic to the political level through a linear process. But this requires the establishment of supranational institutions specifically pushing for this integration process, which is basically the Commission, the bureaucracy at the EC level.

There is also a perception of people that it is a positive process that would gradually lead towards political unity.

The Commission is a technical body.

D) Interpretation of the integration process

- The first move is done by national governments
- Countries agree to pursue integration in a given economic sector
- They appoint a supranational bureaucracy to fully grasp the benefits of integration in sector a. Integration has to be pursued in the cognate b and c sectors. Hence, once the process is set in motion, there is a sort of automatic mechanism that pushes for further integration.

The spillover concept is useful to understand the expansion of competences in favour of EU even during the 80s and 90s.

To pool production of coal and steel and benefit from it, it is not enough to limit the focus on this sector. Probably there will be the need of achieve a minimum level of coordination in different policy areas that are connected to it, such as transportation.

Once the system is put in motion, it is hard to stop it, as it will need to expand in so many different sectors. By deciding to coordinate actions in a field, there will be unexpected consequences, whereby it will only be possible to introduce coordinative measures in a close field.

Hence, once the process is set in motion, there is a sort of automatic mechanism that pushes for further integration.

Thus, according to Haas and Lindeberg, it will be possible only to go forward. By contrast, according to Schmitter, some entrepreneurial actors are needed to push the process in a certain direction through a cultivated spillover, such as the Commission. Therefore, the spillover could

even go backwards or stop, if people are not engaged with it. Human beings are still part of the analysis. (pg 65, Schmitter)

Economic interest of politicians should not be short-sighted and too pragmatic. Otherwise, if the supranational machine will stop holding benefits for them, people will simply withdraw if they did not develop a real support for the EU project. Otherwise integration can quickly turn into disintegration (cfr Haas 68). In the 60s, he already started to revise neofunctionalism: the spillover process was not entirely automatic (cultivated spillover) and it could not be entirely based on satisfying people's needs, as they would turn their back as soon as their needs were not satisfied anymore. So even neofunctionalists were aware that there were some challenges. They introduced specific conditions as they were also trying to provide a theory of regional integration that would go beyond Europe; in fact, there were also attempts of regional integration in Africa (African Union, African continental free trade area) and Latin America.

Conditions that were present in EU for a successful regional integration, other than a bureaucracy capable of pushing the process:

- 1) Pluralistic social structure
- 2) Substantial economic and industrial development (Africa is not the case)
- 3) Common ideological patterns → Similar ideological profile and commonalities in political culture, such as in the governments of founding MSs (Christian democracies who favoured collaboration and bargaining)

Economic and social committee (since 1957) → It represents (economic and social) organized interests in the society. It gives its opinion for each legislative proposal.

According to neofunctionalists, the Commission has a crucial role to play.

Historical facts to understand intergovernmental reaction to neofunctionalism (60s)

- UK asking to be part of the EC; it was rejected twice due to the strong opposition of De Gaulle. France was definitely the leader within the Community, as Germany and Italy were not a strong country at the time, while the UK was a winner of the WWII and De Gaulle did not want to have another boss around. De Gaulle thought that the UK was the door for the US to gain control of Europe, as the UK was very close to the US at the time → Geopolitics and power issues.
- De Gaulle was totally against the Commission having its own budget through MSs resources, as he did not want it to get too powerful and independent → The empty chair crisis: instead of going from unanimity to qualified majority, a MS could still veto a decision → The Luxemburg Compromise → Eurosclerosis

These two episodes can show that the States do have a crucial role in the integration process. Therefore this explanation was not good for what was going on during the 60s.

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INTERGOVERNMENTALISM

A) Historical context

- The 1963 crisis

- De Gaulle vetoed the British membership application
- The president of the Commission Hallstein feels that Britain could slow the integration process.
- The 1965 empty chair crisis: France decides not to participate in the meetings of the Council of Ministers as a reaction to the Commission's proposal on direct EEC budget funding.
- The 1966 Luxemburg Compromise

Opposed to the neofunctionalist theory in which the Commission leads the process, in this theory is France who has the decisive power to lead the integration process, provoking the empty chair crisis. It ends up slowing the integration process, as the Luxemburg compromise implied that the decision making process was still allowing MSs to veto decisions if they did not like them.

B) Scientific context

- Realism in International relations: by the 60s the realist approach is largely dominant in international relations.
- States are the basic units of international politics → European integration is treated as if it was any other international forum, such as the UN, so states are central even in the European integration process.
- National interest is considered as derivative of structural balance of power calculus (the position of the country in the international system) → Some states are naturally more powerful, therefore the dynamics that will develop at the supranational level reflects this balance of power between states. State interests depend on the position of the State within the international system, thus it is very difficult to change them.
- Power is an asymmetric relation between countries

C) Basic assumptions

- Continued centrality of nation states in post-war European politics
- State interests are constructs in which ideas and ideals, precedent and past experience, domestic forces and rulers all play a role
- The maintenance of diversity at the European level. MSs are located differently in the global economy and in the geopolitical context.
- Distinction between high (Security, Defence, Foreign Policy) and low politics; neofunctionalism does not see a watershed between the two fields, unlike intergovernmentalism.
- The logic of integration works insofar as the process guarantees positive sum outcomes → There is no way that the Commission could force the process and alter the game.
- Cooperative activity is possible as far as economic integration is concerned but this will gradually produce uncertainty about where the whole process is heading too.
- Conflict will arise when crucial elements of national identity or autonomy are at stake. States will not compromise their sovereignty (high politics).
- Supranational institutions such as the Court of Justice of EU can be perceived as threats to national political actors, while neofunctionalism saw them as the real leaders in the integration process.

D) The intergovernmental vis a vis the neo-functional approach

- Emphasis on the political in contrast to the neo-functional emphasis on industrialism and technocracy.
- Critique of the automatism of the spill-over process. Political integration cannot be considered the logical corollary of economic restructuring and integration.
- Autonomy of the high politics sphere
- Importance of external factors and the global environment

LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM

International regimes are made of rational actors that pursue their interests.

- The interest of a State is not determined eternally by its position in the international system. On the contrary, it depends on its internal policies and politics. So the position of a state in the bargaining with other states reflects the internal dynamics. So it will probably reflect the strongest economic interests, but they will not be autonomous. It is rather the State that will defend their interests so the State still has a gatekeeping role.

Governance represent a subset of the interest society. The cooperation conflict will reflect the balance that has been reached internally.

Non-cooperation between states produces sub-optimal results. Cooperation can bring positive results, but transaction costs might be very high.

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FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE 20TH CENTURY

The effect of the wars

- 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian war
- French revanchism
- WW in which some territories were shift between France and Germany
- WWI (1914 – 1919)
- German revanchism: Treaty of Versailles → Loss of territories as unfair to them, opposite situation compared to 1871. It resulted in the WWII in which Hitler occupied both Poland and France.

The interwar period

- French occupation of Rhineland (1923)
- First Franco-German couple of Briand and Stresemann (1923-1939) → It's not because they liked each other, but because France realized that its tactic had not functioned very well, so they thought that the best way to get stability in Europe was through Franco-German cooperation. France wanted the Western border to be stabile and secured, while Germany was interested in economic cooperation, but they did not recognize the borders as fixed by the Treaty of Versailles.

→ Brief Franco-German cooperation had existed before the end of WWII.

Briand put forward an idea of Franco-German cooperation. But it could not last; the main reason was the economic crises of 1929 and the rise of ethno-nationalist movements, such as the Nazi.

The effect of the wars

- WWII (1939 – 1945)

- Hitler's occupation of France (1940). It is a difficult period, as in some cases Germans took over towns and appointed German administration, while in other places there is a collaboration between French and Nazis. In Alsace they put German personnel.
- The allies forces liberation (1944-1945) and occupation of Berlin by France: they were also given an occupation zone by allies forces to get them re-assured about the German question.
- This is an important issue after the WWII, as there is no peace treaty that regulates the situation of Germany. At the beginning, Americans wanted 3 Ds for Germany: denazification, decentralization and deindustrialization. This would have resulted in a lot of small German states, and they were supported by France. After the war, it was not feasible anymore: the coal and steel needed for re-construction were mainly produced by Germany. After the WWI Germans had used their resources to produce weapons, so it was a threat for France. It was also the beginning of the Communist threat that could have expand into a deindustrialized Germany. Germany was divided on the federal model of the US, but with a parliamentary system, as it was dangerous to install a presidential system and give the power to one man.
- Elections started from the bottom
- There are two Germany in 1945, and only one is participating in the process of Franco-German reconciliation and coal and steel community and European integration.
- 9 May 1950: Schuman declaration, proposed by Jean Monnet
- Aim: to maintain peace between France and Germany.

At the beginning of European integration, Germany cannot be a leader as it did not exist as a state, but it already participated to it.

The Treaty of Elysée

- The beginning of Franco-German bilateral friendship (22 January 1963). It is interesting not only for the bilateral cooperation, but it also concerns the reconciliation of civil societies, which is very original.
- Adenauer – De Gaulle → They created a true friendship, as they had similar experiences: they had both lived through the WW and they tried already to reconcile after the WWII. So they are willingness to reconcile and they have a mutual respect for each other. It was prepared by mutual State visits.
- The European integration process has probably achieved already some good results. It was also due to towns twinnings.
- There are also geopolitical reasons: in 1963 de Gaulle wanted to make France great again, as it wanted to constitute a nuclear force to keep being an important nation in international relations. He proposed to Adenauer to participate in a bilateral nuclear force to take Germany away from America, as it depended on its protection. So in the political field of the respective countries there was not a full consensus, as there was a division between those who imagined Atlantic relations for Germany and those who preferred a French partnership.
- The equilibrium was that Germany was politically weak but economically strong, while France was politically strong but economically weak. This is why it was a perfect couple, as Germany also still needed recognition by other European countries, while France needed new allies.

- However, after De Gaulle and Adenauer, this partnership did not function very well, as at the time it served both of them's interests.

Franco-German couples

1) Adenauer – De Gaulle (1959-1963)

2) De Gaulle – Ludwig Erhard (1963 – 1966) → Erhard was an Atlantist, so he would have preferred a partnership with the US. Therefore there aren't many initiatives. While De Gaulle withdrew from NATO, which Germany did not like as it just applied for membership. They did not agree on British membership to NATO. It is a fragile moment for the partnership.

3) De Gaulle – Kurt Kiesinger (1966 – 1969) → There is a shift away from the European and Western anchor, as Germany was preparing to focus more on Eastern countries' relations as a new German policy put forward by socialists, as they wanted to overcome their refuse to recognize Eastern Germany. So there is nothing happening at the intergovernmental level, while it keeps functioning at the level of civil and cultural cooperation.

4) Willy Brandt – Georges Pompidou (1969 – 1974) → Brandt is more interest in Eastern relations, but it did not question European integration, and therefore he did not question Franco-German relations, even if it wasn't his priority. However, relations do improve during this period due to the fact that De Gaulle leaves the power, unblocking many issues in which he did not agree with Germany (for instance to give more power to supranational institutions and have an EU budget for Commission). Pompidou adopted a different attitude with regards enlargement and political cooperation. But they did not function very well at the personal level.

5) Helmut Schmidt – Valery Giscard d'Estaing (1974 – 1981) → They managed to form a couple in the process of European integration. They had a good personal relationship, despite being on opposite political affiliation sides. But they had similar experiences in economic affairs and cooperation, so they would try to find an answer to the economic crisis of 1973 (stagflation). They proposed solutions in terms of economic relaunch, but also of monetary stabilization, as the US decided to end the Bretton Woods system, which caused a lot of problems for the European community. It really initiated the idea that Franco-German bilateral relations could really help to get out of a European crisis.

6) Helmut Kohl – Francois Mitterrand (1982 – 1995) → They did not have a common political affiliation, but international relations brought them together. There was a strong need for cooperation at this time, as both France and Soviet Union announced that they were going to modernize its nuclear forces, but it implies a security problem for Germany, as it is in the middle of Europe. The left wing in Germany had even to ask the US for a nuclear re-armament, and it led to the appointment of Kohl as Liberalists left the government. NATO threatened Soviet Union to re-arm again. The German population did not agree with it. Mitterrand supported Kohl in asking the German government to allow the re-armament; it was also in the interests of France to have an equilibrium. So the couple was functioning very well. However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, despite the good relations, there is a very negative reaction by France to the possibility of re-unification, as the historical fear of a big Germany came up again. Mitterrand went to the Eastern German regime to support it, in order to avoid reunification; it was also feared by Thatcher's UK. The problem for the bilateral relations would be that Germany would be as powerful as France. By contrast, the US supported the idea of re-unification, which had to be done by an international negotiation involving the 4 allies, including the Soviet Union. At the beginning, the Franco-German couple did not function well in this procedure. It was also the case during the attempt to create a European Defence Community.

German re-unification was also favoured by the economic situation of East Germany, which was falling apart; in fact, economic unification was made before the political unification, as the mark was introduced before political unity.

7) Helmut Kohl – Jacques Chirac (1995 – 1998) → They are both right wing politicians; they function well, probably due to the success of the re-unification process in Germany and of the European integration process, except for the issue of security and defence. An issue was the possible intervention of Germany in Bosnia during the Balcan's Wars; eventually, Germany contributed through arms and materials, rather than through a direct intervention. This issue affected Franco-German relations, as Germany felt abandoned in dealing with security.

8) Gerhard Schroder – Jacques Chirac (1998 – 2005) → They both avoided to participate in the intervention in Iraq of 2003, but for Germany it was more an electoral strategy, rather than to have an alliance with France. This traumatized German-American relationships, as Germany supported France for the first time.

9) Angela Merkel – Jacques Chirac (2005 – 2007) → Germany had the presidency of the European Council and had to prepare the Lisbon Treaty. So they functioned well in this matter.

10) Angela Merkel – Nicolas Sarkozy (2007 – 2012) → They did not function very well, especially due to the economic crisis, to which they responded through national strategies, rather than a common one. Germany was also considered as more influential than France for the first time, and French did not like it.

11) Angela Merkel – Francois Holland (2012 – 2017) → It functioned better but it was not very efficient in saving EU from crises. This is the revelation that this couple is no longer enough to put forward and push ideas in a Union of 28 MSs: they can no longer be the motor of European integration.

12) Angela Merkel – Emmanuelle Macron (2017 – today) → They signed again a bilateral treaty, in order to give a sign of renewal of Franco-German relationship.

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What's geographical view of geopolitics) – Geostrategy

- The analysis of the interaction between geographical settings and perspectives, and international politics
- Geographical settings: physical, economic, socio-cultural and political spatial features, patterns and lines of connection
- Hierarchy – in the spatial and political terms
 - Spatiality – micro/meso/macro
- Centralized / decentralized states

It depends on the legacy of the Soviet Union

- Sovereignty – consists of five orders
- Big powers → The US, EU, Japan, Russia and China → Most of these states focus on CEE

The level of education in post-Communist countries, the level of high education is very high compared to other European countries. They can provide cheap and skilled labour. → The engine of economic integration after 2008 moved from Germany and France to CEE, as those countries were unable to provide services and resources.

Elements of power – are CEE countries powerful?

- Critical mass of human and material resources, including numbers, quality, variety, geographical access and level of technology and culture.
- Nuclear technology
- Degree of national cohesiveness (social, religious, cultural, ethnic and racial factors and sense of national history). (1) Size and centrality of a dominant group's location; (2) Political stability/instability
- Political, military and economic energy levels, from high surplus to maintenance to minimum survival.

These countries are highly dependent on Eu, but at the same time France and Germany are highly dependent on CEE for cheap labour.

Slovakia is colonized by South Korea through the Kia industries: the economy of the country depends for 22% of its GDP on Kia, but if Kia decided to go away the economy of the country would collapse, so it is practically a colonized country.

A lot of countries of CEE are dependent on Western capital as well, which is invested in different areas. For instance, the Netherlands is leasing porks to CEE countries, who raised them but they do not get any profit.

Elements of power

- Geographical range based on global and regional locations and effective reach to other orders of the hierarchy.
- Pattern and density of networks of international trade, political and cultural links.
- Degree of openness to new ideas and economic strategies which characterize the national system.
- Economic, political and military strength relative to neighbouring states.
- Clarity and consistency of goals and strategy for wielding influence beyond its border.
- Number and complexity of international issues, including conflicts, that a state can handle simultaneously as a measure of its political scope.

Relative power

- Poland – region's largest economy
- Other post-Communist countries – less significant
- Strategically – a buffer zone from East to West, from North to South
- In the EU – bandwagoning strategy / coalition builders

Geopolitical structure

- Very strong relationship between a nation's foreign policy-making and geopolitical structure.
- Structures – geographical dimensions (distance and access), patterns of resource use, trade, capital and migration flows, levels of technology and cultural/religious differences.
- Baltic states v CEE / homogeneous CEE states vs differentiated.

Geopolitical settings

- Major physical settings – the maritime and continental

Maritime → economic specialization (Greece, Netherlands, the US, Taiwan)

- Economies – self-sufficient; political system – less open to new ideas (closed and autocratic).
- CEE – under Soviet rule – torn between East/West, North/South

- Historic or natural cores – areas in which states originate and out of which the state idea is developed.

- Capitals or political centres – the political

Geopolitical rift

From 2008 onwards – Eastern borders of Europe have been moving westwards

- Armenia, Georgia, Crimea – under Russian influence / control

- Next in line – Slovakia, Latvia, Hungary, Moldova

- Poland/Ukraine – a buffer zone for W/E forces

- After Brexit – strategic change in the EU

- Different strategies: PRC – long-term economic alliances (dragon's gift)

- Russia – managing disorder / push and pull logic

- The US – big power game

- Instruments: energy/economy/market access

- Strategic dependence: fertilizers, cement, trucks, ball bearings, solar panels

- Military: NATO bases (under Obama) move eastwards.

Tendencies

- Upcoming elections in CEE countries

- Changes are necessary

- New alliances with PRC – growing cooperation in industry and economy

- Shift in Persian Gulf

- CEE economies dependent on EU cohesion funds

- In Poland, over half of national public investment between 2014 and 2017 came from EU funds, while in Romania EU funding accounts for over 60% of public investment spending.

- CEE also dependent on France, Netherlands, Germany and Italy as source of capital.

- Recovery in the EU boosted demand on export from CEE.

Drivers for growth

- Large domestic consumer market – in Poland comprising 61% of GDP (similar to the US).

- New economy – video games sector.

- Influx of migrants: 1,1 mln in 2018.

- Ukrainian immigrants have a positive impact of 0,3 – 0,9% on GDP per year.

- The highest immigration inflow is absolute numbers for any EU country.

Surprisingly, despite central governments being Eurosceptical, youngsters of CEE countries support EU. Population of CEE countries usually support the local government, but not the central national government.

Conclusions

- Facilitating the conversion of the Russian periphery into a gateway region, rather than turning it into a Shatterbelt.
- Recognition that CEE countries are of an equal economic and strategic stake in the current Middle East Shatterbelt
- Anticipating the emergence of Euromediterranea, but fairly controlled by Russia.

Poland 2020: main goals and developments

New opening after 2015

- Domestic context in 2015
- Governance by conflict
- International / European context
- Domestic context in 2018

Domestic context in 2015

The pattern of conservative thinking still exists in Poland.

- Political fatigue of ruling coalition – Civic platform/Polish Peasant Party
- Politics of warm water in the tap
- External pressure – Ukraine, migration, climate policy
- Social promises, social engineering
- Church – conservative alliance of divided right parties against other political actors
- Prank parties

Context of 2015

- Changes are necessary, in every field (law, social security, higher education)

Main idea of governance

- Divided house – divide et impera
- Truly sovereign actors – who can impose the state of exception

Areas of conflict

- Cities vs countryside
- Law vs justice
- Workers vs High-educated
- Pro-life vs Pro-choice
- Democracy vs a state of exception
- Sovereignty vs Post-colonial narrative
- EU vs atlantism

But paradoxically pro-Russian stance.

- Similar countries: Russia Turkey Island.

Conflicts, why?

- Mostly economic reasons
- Changes are too slow and less radical than expected
- Tightening public debt due to economic crisis
- Big migrations, big expectations
- Social tremors / quivers – high official unemployment, low wages, short contracts
- Political fatigue
- In fact: most of positive changes came with previous government (long maternity leave, complimentary textbooks but no paychecks for everyone)

After the possible future crises in CEE countries, the level of support for EU will be lower.

Current situation

- Political opposition – without any convincing ideas
- Conflict between two groups of the same elite
- Back-stage elites – Schmitt's ideas and 30s
- People in power – minds taken by simplistic ideas
- Largest public debt since 1989
- Creeping deflation
- BUT growing wages

Context of 2018

- As of October 2019, 40% of support for law and justice
- Fairly high support – a need for conflict to keep sovereign power
- Old/new areas of conflict
- (1) External enemies (Russia, Germany, Brussels)
- (2) Domestic (old elites, ideologies)
- Vision of a nation under siege

Challenges ahead

- Elections for local government
- New law for local budget
- Ukraine
- Brexit
- Climate policy / EU fertiliser Regulation / EU budget
- Article 7 TEU – first time in EU history
- Most existential challenges to the EU

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Differentiated integration, or nature of the beast

- Many models and views
 - Two groups of factors: domestic and external
- Domestic: demand and supply for DI (Duina)

External: less important, based on national preferences (Commitology → Based on committees elected by national governments; its role is more important than expected. But it took a long time

for MSs to learn what they can do with Commitology; there are both slow and fast countries, but not all countries have the necessary expertise to contribute to them)

Duina → Countries integrate more easily when they share the same law, and not same religious belief or culture. Otherwise there are many problems in the understanding of some legal terms and even the process. Again the law of the UK is very different from that of Germany, which is a federal country with shared sovereignty.

When the politicians of CEE countries decide to follow Western ideas, they have no problems with the EU, but it does not happen very often.

However, the legal systems of CEE countries

Domestic incentives for DI

- Demand for DI comes from: economy (especially agriculture), constitutional / law tradition, society
- Supply: political ideology

Romania and Bulgaria are not participating in the Schengen acquis of community law. In fact, they do not have enough skills, but it was also a political decision, as it would have meant for these countries to share data with EU and to spend more for infrastructures and personnel.

Society

- Life satisfaction is slightly below the EU average (73% to 75%)
- More positive on the national economy (34% to 18%) but in general new MSs are less sceptical
- Most important issues are unemployment and rising prices (50% to 27%)
- Do not trust the government (65% to 70%), but they trust EU (47% to 34%), especially Poland and Romania.
- The EU has a positive image in Poland (42% to 31%). However, the EU has more neutral image for Polish citizens (47% to 41%).

Only 5 countries in the EU spend more than 5% in military spending, among which there are also Poland and Romania, who mostly purchase military equipment from the US. On the contrary, Baltic countries are more and more integrated with EU projects such as PESCO.

Poland is not participating in the project of EU to buy a heavy lift plane; these are provided by Ukraine.

- General knowledge of EU is not so high, however 60% declares to know how EU works
- 76% (to 64%) are for CFSP.
- 69% are for further enlargement (to 36%).
- Positive image of EU officials. Even if one big enemy is Frans Timmerman.

Law / legal tradition

- Integration mostly without problems
- Continental model of law
- European Warrant Arrest – the Constitution Amendment
- However, Poland has issued more EAW than any other MSs (3500 in 2010), mostly to UK

Political system / Ideology

- Unitary state

- After 2005, the Polish political scene has been dominated by right central parties.

The ECB is the actor with more credentials in the EU, as it is also part of international organizations. The second rising actor in the EU is the European Court of Auditors, as it is necessary to check the compliance of CEE countries with rule of law, to which the releasing of EU funds is conditioned.

- Catholic church, less important but still
- Views in discourse:
 - Europe as a chance or opportunity
 - EU as a legitimate source of order
 - EU as a threat
 - EU as a restraint on Germany and France

Expectations

- Poland as a Trojan horse in the EU, due to Atlantism
- Rising prices / inflation in Poland
- From 2016 onwards – lowest unemployment ever (3,1%)
- Clientelism (the UK and budget 2005)
- Low performance on the EU level

CEE countries sent their troops abroad for EU reasons to train them until 2004. In fact the number of casualties was very high and the wages were quite low. It was also for security reasons.

Strategy

- Euro-scepticism of 2004, diminishing to 2015
- EU as a leverage for domestic preferences,
- Wise intergovernmentalism / mixed coalitions
- More Europe

- Firm stand → Fiscal pact
CEE countries refused to follow it.

Areas for DI in Poland

- Euro currency
- Schenghen
- Environment
- Pruem Convention

Future predictions

- It is thought to predict something, a possible area of DI is the EURO currency
- Deepening as 2019 is less probable

Introduction

Meaning of Europeanization

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The concepts of identity and interests.

Shift of sovereignty

Politics and political systems are challenged by:

- Economy → Politics is no longer having the primacy, so there is a downplay of the role of the political system
- Technological developments → It is a major threat for democracy

There are more dimensions of conflict, but many people do not perceive politics as the proper place in which negotiate and deal with conflicts.

The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective (1996)

Pierson presents the main arguments of intergovernmentalism in the first section. The article was written in the mid 90s, so a period in which there is an acceleration of the integration process and a great expansion of EU competences, after a period of Eurosclerosis of the 70s and 80s. Also Moravicks writes his piece about liberal intergovernmentalism in the 90s, but when Pierson wrote the article, intergovernmentalism was still prevalent.

Like intergovernmentalism, also new institutionalism comes from the US. It also draws inspiration from the pluralist approach, which downplays the role of institutions in favour of organized interests, that whose forces were reflected in each decision.

→ The dominant approach had been intergovernmentalism, as what was happening during the 70s had sort of proved neofunctionalism wrong.

→ EC as a standard international regime, rather than a sui generis entity.

→ Three main elements will be covered: emphasis on sovereignty, institutions as instruments, bargaining among MSs.

Member State Preoccupation with Sovereignty Issues.

→ Preferences are given because depends on the position of the MSs in the international scene.

→ It is usually impossible to exercise autonomy over states.

→ Security concerns were already addressed by NATO and the US, so MSs could also focus on relative gains.

→ MSs will evaluate whether the benefits are higher than the costs.

The Instrumentality of Institutions.

→ Institutions are used by MSs to facilitate agreements between them, as they reduce transaction costs.

→ It allows to take into consideration the intensity of preferences

→ Principal – agent theory: in this view, the agent (Commission) is in the hand of the principals (MSs)

The Centrality of Intergovernmental Bargains

→ Intergovernmentalism is only concerned with the history changing decisions of Treaties: what happens between these grand bargains is irrelevant. He on the contrary emphasizes these periods of consolidation.

II. An Historical Institutionalist Critique

→ The room for maneuver is restricted and constrained by decision that were taken previously.

→ Path dependency comes from the concept of policy legacy. This also means that policies are incremental. Once certain policies have been introduced, it is difficult to change them.

The opposite is path shifting policies.

→ Treaties simply consolidate what has been going on in between treaties as an informal practice.

→ Gap in the capacities of the states to actually control what is going on at the supranational level.

→ There is an original institutions design, but it does not correspond to the way in which events actually develop.

→ Explanation on how these gaps emerge, building on the idea that states are not able to actually control institutions created.

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The partial autonomy of EC institutions

→ The first problem of any kind organization is its own survival, including public organizations in some cases. However, most of the time, public organizations does not suffer from the possibility of going bankrupts, so their next interest is actually to strengthen its own capacities and expand their competences.

→ Institutions need that level of power to do their job, but the risk is that these institutions

→ Commission has two main assets to increase its power

- Agenda setting
- Process Manager

→ The commission is a small institution, so it needs to rely on experts, and it is the Commission that calls these experts in the process.

→ At the national level, it is usually distributive ad redistributive policies, while at the EU level is mostly regulatory policies, as Eu does not have a large budget. In this way, the costs are shifted at the national level.

→ The commission has also to consider MSs preferences, but it still greatly influences the process.

→ The ECJ is the best example of the neo-functionalist argument that EC institutions had acquired great power and went in a completely different direction respect to what MSs had in mind, as initially it only had to check what was done at the EU level, while eventually it ended up controlling what was done within MSs.

Principles of supremacy and direct effect

→ Autonomy of EC institutions may be more apparent than real, because they know that if they do something else will get a strong reaction by MSs, so they anticipate possible opposition from

MSs → They are going as far as they think they can, so they are not exactly so autonomous. This claim might contradict previous claims. This implies that there is not a straight supervision by MSs
→ Limit to the neofunctionalist argument.

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→ Issue density: It is difficult to keep track of what is going on in all of these areas. Usually MSs will rely on representatives in Brussels.
There are cross-influences from one sector to the other, it is going to be difficult to be aware of everything that is decided in Brussels.

A change in government would not usually affect a traditional international organization →
Usually countries would not change their position in the international scene if there is a change at the level of domestic politics.

The topics that are addressed at the EU level are issues that have an effect on domestic policies.

UK opted out of the social policy protocol of the Maastricht Treaty, but after a change of domestic government, it allowed the inclusion of this chapter in the Treaty of Amsterdam.

A firm can introduce changes if something is not working well, but this is not the case for the political systems, which have to come to terms with decisions that have been taken previously.

→ Sunk costs

- Privatization of social care services during the 80s

Especially in the UK, women entered the labour market and with those revenues the social care services were enlarged. But at a certain point, with the trend of privatization those women lost their job and became unemployed. Once a decision is taken, it is almost impossible to reverse it, even if the decision is wrong.

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The role of the EU at the UN

- **The Council of the EU**

It is the heart of the decision-making process; each MS is represented by its ministers. Unanimity is the common decision-making procedure.

Take decisions to implement CFSP based on general guidelines by the European Council.

Recommends common strategies and implement them with joint action and common positions.

The CFSP seeks to preserve peace, strengthen international security and promote international cooperation, develop and consolidate democracy, promote the respect of human rights.

The problem is that everyone would agree to be for peace. The aim of CFSP, however, is also to promote EU interests. Sometimes there might be a coincidence, but not always. For instance, we might promote democracy in Africa just to get closer to its resources. This strict conditionality imposed by the EU (free elections) does not apply to proposals coming from different countries, such as China.

Thus, how is it possible to convince African leaders to accept these conditions?

- **European Council**

- **The European Commission**

It is less powerful than the Council in this sphere: it can give recommendations related to CFSP. CSFP enables EU to take a leading role in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and strengthening of international security. It is an integral part of EU comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets.

- **The European External Action Service**

In reality, the only thing MSs can agree on is a minimum common denominator.

The UN is the international organization that deals with an array of different issues worldwide. Many of the values of EU and the UN are shared values. The main goal of the UN at its foundation was to protect international peace and security after two world wars. It also wants to improve the situation of human rights around the world; currently it is still bad, but it has never been better.

EU at the UN

1) Monetary

Together, the MSs pay about 40% of the regular budget, which is fairly small (even if not a lot of people work for the UN, but rather at the UN → Ambassadors are employers of the country of origin), and about a third of the peacekeeping budget, which is given as a donation by EU, whereas other countries want to be paid back.

2) Status

The EU delegation of the EU at the headquarter of New York has the status of enhanced observers, as the EU is not a state. This allows EU to bring in proposals and make speeches, but it cannot vote and cannot fill in candidates. However, MSs can still vote and will be in favour of EU proposals: a quota up to a third of voting power actually belongs to the EU. Also other states with which EU cooperate financially will be in favour of EU proposals.

The EU also works closely with the Secretariat and its agencies and programmes on a range of global issues, including:

- Sustainable development
- Human rights
- Climate change
- Peace building and conflict prevention
- Humanitarian assistance

For instance, the EU was asked to be part of the deal with Iran concerning nuclear weapons, as requested by Iran itself and other states (they thought that they could get a more favorable deal). The EU is also a part of the Good Friday Agreement of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, to have a more secure deal: after Brexit, EU won't be part anymore of these negotiations.

Security Council

It is the most powerful body of the UN: it can take decisions that have to be carried out and have the power to enforce its decisions through economic sanctions and military intervention.

If Brexit is going to happen, EU will lose 50% of the veto power.

→ Permanent members: China, UK, France, Russia, USA

→ Non-permanent members (10)

EU could have 2 permanent members and 4 elected members in the Security Council. The permanent members can block any decision that they do not like. In many areas, EU is working well: in many areas (education, human rights, climate change), in 75% of decisions there is a common position among EU MSs. In the area of peace and security, the situation is different: in the CFSP, an exception for France and the UK is allowed for the issue of nuclear weapons, due to their presence in the Security Council.

At the moment, there are 3 EU members among non permanent members: Belgium, Poland and Germany.

Since a few years, also non-permanent members can be in charge of the writing of the texts, and this gives them much more organizational power and control.

Looking at the peacekeeping missions of the UN and the EU, they are acting quite in the same places (mostly Africa).

The UN budget for peacekeeping missions of EU is 0,5% of the global military expenditure per year (less than 8 millions of dollars).

In the future, there could be joint EU and UN missions, while now the UN often turns to NATO for military equipment and soldiers, with the EU being only a second choice.

At the moment there is a cooperation between France and Germany within the Security Council: they are trying to change the Security Council. They proposed to introduce a joint two months program for the UN for March and April.

2015 – 2030: 17 Sustainable Development Goals

The UN will support States who try to implement these SDGs.

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SDGs → Current strategy of the UN, replaced the previous MDGs, which were clear targets more focused on social priorities that had to be achieved by 2015. Some indicators were actually achieved, but some areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa are still behind. SDGs are also focused on environmental issues.

At the UN level, there is a little budget, especially since the US is not paying its share of the budget.

Both the UN and WHO are in trouble in terms of legitimation, as Southern countries claim that these organizations mainly represent Northern countries.

At this point, it is difficult to achieve all of these targets; it would be better to have just less and more focused targets.

The EU strongly supports the SDGs.

However, there is a gap between discourse and policy practice, also between what the EU would like to do and its actual capacities.

This is also due to the gap that there is between what the EU does and what are the perceptions of EU citizens: there is skepticism about EU's actions, and thus the support of EU is diminishing. To what extent has the attitude change from a passive consensus to an active dissensus?

Support for the EU in times of crisis

Some countries seem to share certain features

- Southern Europe: Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Malta, Cyprus
- North-Western Europe (Continental and Northern Europe): Germany, the UK, France, Belgium, Holland
- Central Eastern Europe

Until 1991, around 70% of people of SE thought that EU membership was a good thing, while the percentage of NEW was about 50%. From the Maastricht Treaty, both rates started to decline. Looking at 2011, this difference has disappeared, reaching about 45%. However, the more substantial drop is for SE, which at certain moment even reached 80% of support for EU. For NEW, the final percentage is actually close to the initial percentage. Therefore, the trends are not exactly the same for the three parts of EU.

Looking at the support for EU depending on the level of education, the higher support comes from those who received a tertiary education, while the support of the people who had the lowest level of education went from 40% to about 5%, so there is a tremendous drop. The support of people who had a secondary education went from 55% to 20%.

It is people who had a lower level of education that think that they are not getting much out of Europe, and they probably do not fully understand the EU system, which is a highly complex system.

In CEE, people trust more EU democracy than national governments, which is the opposite of what happens in North and Western Europe. On the contrary, in the Southern Europe, EU and national government are more or less at the same level of trust, which is not that high.

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The confining conditions of the European integration process

The roots of what has been happening over the last few years have their roots in past happenings and also in the very original design of the European Union.

1. The EU development over the last 50 years goes against the flow

- A five century long process that led to the territorial structuring of the European system of nation states.
- Different types of boundaries reinforcing each other progressively separated European polities [political systems and communities].

We should consider that the European integration is only the sixth phase of European nation states development. The only phase that lowered differences was that of capitalist economic development: European countries became increasingly different over time.

I. State-building → There is a center that controls the periphery, so there is a consolidation of the external borders. It was an early development for Spain and the UK. It occurred much later in two of European countries, towards the end of 19th century: Germany and Italy. It is difficult to control borders only basing it on violence, so the solution is trying to build a national identity, for instance through language.

II. Capitalist development

III. Nation-building → The process according to which population ends up feeling part of a community: the building of a sense of identity. Italy developed compulsory primary education to spread the idea that people were citizens of Italy, rather than at the dependence of Vatican State.

IV. Democratization → States become even more different, as the state apparatus can be set up in completely different ways.

V. Welfare states development → It developed especially after WWII, even if social legislation was already present since 1882/1883 thanks to Bismarck. The first compulsory social insurance happened first in Germany, but after that many countries followed this path; it provides protection to people depending on the occupational status, reflecting the differences in the labour market.

2. The confining conditions of the original integration project which was launched in the 1950s

- After the WWII, the economic and military constellation was restructured in a direction that bypassed the European system of nation-states. The post-war international order was dominated by two states that were external to the core European system of state: the USA and USSR.
- A transfer of sovereignty into two regional subsystems (Western and Eastern): foreign policy was not completely under states' control.
- Monetary Western integration was also organized along Atlantic lines (Bretton Woods).
- Security and monetary integration were organized between the trans-Atlantic partners under US leadership.
- Economic integration was perceived as a positive factor both for strengthening the western bloc (to avoid the risk of Communism and to be stronger before the Soviet Union in the bipolar world) and for providing more resources for national welfare states, as economies were bound to grow due to this integration. At the beginning, the different nature of these two fields were not seen as contradictory.

3. The hybrid nature of the EU

The EU was born out of international treaties, but it cannot be regarded as an international organization.

- Through a series of autonomous interpretative decisions, the ECJ transformed European law from a system of public international law into a system of law similar to that of constitutional federal states.
- This passage highlights the EU' transformation from an intergovernmental organization governed by international law into a legal regime vertically integrated.
- The EU can impose economic sanctions and participate in peacekeeping missions.

- But the exclusion of coercion, which was still controlled by states, for the enforcement of any internal behavioral conformity makes it different from any previous attempt at unification.
- Further, no clear – cut closure of the territorial border of the EU has so far been defined. The lack of a sense of permanent borders is a cause of the difficulty of building a national identity within EU.
- The EU is an institutional system that allocates values, which is a state's function, within a defined community of individuals.
- The EU has almost no powers in the definition of those equality areas that are crucial for the creation of loyalties, and for building a European common identity

4. The distinctive profile of EU decision-making

- The Commission has been extremely active in expanding EU competences.
- The careers and resources of Commission officials are dependent upon the continued and further expansion of the integrative tasks they are required to carry on.
- A large majority of EU decisions are taken at a bureaucratic level (even if they are formally adopted by the Council). Each type of Council tends to act autonomously.
- The institutional architecture of EU has made it possible for economic interests to have direct access to EU decision making. Usually citizens do not have a wide access to institutions.
- Economic interests often attempt to influence decisions through expert advice.
- Since issues to be dealt at the supranational level are often extremely complex this has allowed experts to play a crucial role in EU policy making.

At the EU level, it is not entirely possible to hold accountable certain political figures for the decisions taken, while at the national level there is a more direct link. At the national level, voters are able to change their vote to punish political parties.

- Bureaucracies are given opportunities to evade parliamentary control mechanisms at the national level.
- These processes have contributed to the depoliticization of European public policies.

The complex division of competences between the EU and Member States

- Powers of MSs
- Powers of EU
- Concurrent competences

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5. Citizens and parties are not in the picture

Identity, competition and electoral availability – Stabilization of European electorate

The party system in Western Europe remained pretty much the same: scholars talk about a freezing for what concerns cleavages (Rokkan).

- Centre – periphery cleavage
- Urban – rural areas cleavage;

c) State – Church cleavage;

d) Capital – labour cleavage;

According to Rokkan, party systems across Europe were structured on the bases of these cleavages. If there is only an active cleavage, the party system is going to be much simpler, as there is only one dimension of conflict.

During the 80s and 90s, the industrial society that developed during the 20th century started to change. There was a decline of number of workers in big industrial plants: big industrial plants were forced to compete with the production coming from other parts of the world. Therefore there is a sudden increase in unemployment across Europe. Until the 70s, the rate of unemployment was 5%, while in the 80s it got to 10-20%. There was a slowing down in the European economic growth, and it was also the end of the golden age.

People were more insecure.

There was a substantial increase in the number of immigrants; until this moment, there was practically no migration, except for Germany and the UK (people of former colonies). On the contrary, no migration flows were more consistent, especially towards France, where people of African former colonies headed to.

The new right (1993) – Betz

It was not just Europeans anymore, but also people coming from the Maghreb.

These migration flows have provoked sentiments of anxiety and resentment.

Arguments put forward by emerging populist parties in mid 80s:

- Financial burden (stealing jobs and healthcare services) imposed by refugees in countries of arrival → They played a part in laying foundation for the economic advancement of Western Europe; they are also taxpayers.
- Low level of education of migrants, who perform unskilled or semiskilled labour → The level of education was so low that it is questionable the assumption of stealing jobs for indigenous population.

This trend starts in France because that is where there is an increasing number of non-European immigrants. But there is a spread towards other European countries, which also brings anxiety and resentment.

Populist and Eurosceptic reactions in continental and northern Europe are not simply a reaction to the Euro crisis (2008) and refugees crisis. The problem has roots that go back to the 80s, with immigration progressively becoming more relevant in these countries. The traditional mainstream parties were unable to give reassurance and provide answers to people that were worried about what was happening in their societies, so the party system started to crumble and new parties started to emerge. They were talking to these low-skilled people that were worried about their future. There is an issue about to what extent these parties are responding to actual societal needs or are actually manipulating these processes.

These parties do not need an underlying organization anymore, as they try to have a direct link between the leader and the people, downplaying the role of organizations.

Traditional parties are unable to react to the situation and elaborate a new strategy.

In Germany, it is an issue of historical legacy and a better reaction to the economic crisis that made it more difficult for this sentiment to emerge.

Right wing Populism

- Direct link with the leader
- Conception of people as one single block, so who are the others? It is necessary to find an enemy.

Left wing populism developed in Southern Europe, especially in Greece, Spain and Italy. It is basically against the elites.

In Continental and Northern we are witnessing a progressive decline in the support for EU, which is linked to the progressive development of this populist parties, that have been there in some cases since the 80s (Front National).

The economic situation was not so bad in Continental and Northern Europe, even after the crisis, whereas in Southern Europe the situation was more dramatic.

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EU INTEGRATION: A SOUTHERN PERSPECTIVE

The South is at the same time an axis and not, as it has common interests in some areas such as agriculture, but not in areas such immigration.

The South and EEC accession (80s)

- To consolidate democracy that were born in the 70s and rule of law, which was new for some countries such as Portugal. Authoritarian regimes could appear again: European integration was mostly about democracy rather than peace.
- To embed the post-dictatorial system into the mainstream West.

A path to political stability and economic prosperity

- Southern Europe joined the EEC in order to protect its fragile democratic institutions and to enhance prosperity.
- To a large extent a project of the elites, not directly linked to citizens
- A government-led process
- A politicized project
- Right vs Left, traditionist vs modernist

Greece after 1974

- A country with particular problems
 - The post war imperfect democracy
 - Driven by internal strife
 - And strong external influence
- And particular needs
 - Restore full democracy
 - And become a normal country

Europe was something alien for Greece, European integration was never something that Greece desired; to a large extent, it was an external enterprise.

Greece and the EU before the crisis

- An uneasy relationship

The arrival of PASOK in power (1981) puts at risk the recent membership.

- Turns into a love affair

PASOK quickly adapts to the European project and adopts a pro-EU stance.

- With a lot of love gifts on the way

The significant increase in EU funding allowed Greece to become finally a wealthy nation.

It was linked to the Delors Commission, who wanted to demonstrate a more direct action of EU for citizens; this is why he increased the funding towards Southern MSs. Greece felt that the enlargement towards Spain and Portugal would mean more competitors for funds and resources.

The south in the EU

→ The development of European integration

- A significant budget boon, which allowed the south to fight for further integration, but not necessarily in favour of further commitments.
- An intergovernmental approach and the lack of multi-level awareness.
- The fight of the poorer – the relations between South and the Eastern European enlargement
- The Italian case: the weakness of the national level is counterbalanced by a drive for further EU integration (till the 90s).

For most Northern European countries, EU funding is additional to national funding, in the sense that it helps to cover inabilities to have a good regional development level. By contrast, in the southern perspective, EU funding is the price paid by northern countries to enlarge their single market. The South had to give away a large part of their features: for instance, Greece had industries that were nationally subsidised and these had to close down.

The economic crisis (2009-2015)

Although usually linked to Greece, it was not the only country involved, even if it was the country that was most affected by it. It brought it to the forefront.

The origins: the impact of the world crisis

One important aspect of the EU integration was economic and monetary union.

- Again, an elite-driven objective.
- With a significant resonance among the population.
- But linked to the convergence efforts to be able to join the single currency.
- The perception of a German-driven EU integration.

The Greek crisis was not just a debt crisis

This was not just a debt crisis; it was also:

- Economic → Successive governments had been pursuing an inappropriate economic policy mix.
- Increasingly political → Successive governments were unable to remedy the basic deficiencies of fiscal policy and to introduce reform in a large number of policy sectors.
- Social → Societal interests resist and block change.

Thus, it was linked to the relationship between the political system, economy and society.

The origins of the crisis: the EU dimension

- Greek crisis → The first real test case for the institutional framework of the Eurozone

- EMU lacks an E → No economic government, no common economic policies
- Budgetary policies remained national
- The Stability and Growth Pact (excessive deficit procedure) has proven to be inadequate
- Maastricht Treaty → It lacks a bail out clause.

The crisis was not handled by the ECB, but by MSs and by other actors such as European Stability Mechanism, which is a company based in Brussels. One consequence of the crisis was that it provoked a return to the intergovernmental approach: the solution founded came from an agreement between MSs, while the ECB was part of the discussion but was not really deciding.

- The fear of contagion to other economies of the Eurozone → Bail out agreement with the ECB and the IMF.
- Similar agreement with Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus
- Greece was the weakest link and the situation of Greece's public finances is still the worst in the Eurozone.
- Since the outbreak of the crisis, three different bailout agreements have failed to meet their intermediate targets
- Consolidation policies faced the opposition of most opposition parties and interest groups.

Gradually, Southern European states started to look at EU as a heartless stepmother, who punishes her children. This was followed by a negative vision of Germany in Greece.

The politicization of the crisis

- The challenge (Portugal) or even collapse (Spain, Greece) of the pre-crisis political systems.
- A new dividing line: pro and anti bail-out parties.
- Widespread anti-establishment protests
- A growing legitimacy deficit → This is the most important issue in EU integration today.
- Rise of new protest parties
- Euroscepticism
- Populism

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The history of immigration to Europe

- Europe is a continent of emigration
- But at the same time has always had immigration as well
- Up to WWII, mostly intra-European immigration
- As of the 50s, organized labour migration (mostly from Mediterranean countries)
- At the same period Europe witnessed an increase in refugees (mostly Eastern countries)

Refugees = person in need of international protection, to which states were obliged to provide this protection. This people cannot be returned to a country where their life is threatened. There is a number of obligations that are linked to those who are refugees, and not to migrants.

Migration and asylum as an EU policy

- Immigration and asylum were not part of the original EEC integration policies
- Exclusively national competences

- As of 80s, there was a gradual re-approachment of asylum policies (in the context of intergovernmental cooperation) due to:
 - Freedom of movement and creation of the single market
 - Increased number of asylum applications (from begin of 70s), especially from Eastern Europe, since the Communists facilitated this movement
 - Changes in national immigration policies

The increase of irregular migration

- Post-1970, Europe gradually discontinues organized labour migration, but maintains
 - Family reunification
 - Refugees
 - Skilled workers
- Since the 80s, Europe witnesses an increase of irregular migration. People lived in a sort of limbo, without documents but they were still accepted by authorities.
 - Overstays (UK, France, Spain)
 - Increasingly refugees from war-torn countries outside Europe (Middle East, Asia, Africa)

The gradual involvement of EU in migration and asylum policies

Asylum policies in the Treaty of Maastricht

- The treaty sets up the third pillar of Justice and home affairs, to which migration and asylum belonged to.

The communitarisation of the asylum policies in the treaty of Amsterdam

- The treaty integrates asylum into Union law.

The Tampere conclusion (1999)

To establish a common European Asylum System which should include, in the short term:

- A clear and workable determination of the State responsible for the examination of an asylum application.
- Common standards for a fair and efficient asylum procedure
- Common minimum conditions of reception of asylum seekers
- The approximation of rules on the recognition and content of the refugee status

The first wave of EU legislation (2000 – 2005)

- Eurodac regulation
- Reception conditions directive
- Dublin-II regulation → At the beginning, it was a convention signed in Dublin and it was turned into a regulation after the EU acquired competences in the asylum matters
- Refugee qualification directive
- Directive on the procedures to recognize refugee status
- As well as temporary protection in case of mass influx directive

A securitized approach

- The increase in irregular entries → Increase in the use of asylum as a means of (even temporary) stay in Europe.
- And to political changes:
 - An increase in mixed migration flows (both migrants and refugees at the same time)

- A strengthening of anti-immigration stances in Europe
- The gradual consideration of migration as a security issue → Irregular entries, border controls, emphasis on returns and deportation, effort to distinguish between refugees and migrants (despite being clear in the past, in the 90s, this distinction had become blurred)

The Dublinisation of EU asylum policy

- In the 90s, the Dublin system becomes significant for asylum policies due to and leads to the predominance of the illegal entry criterion.
- A gradual distinction between MS receiving and sending Dublin cases

The growing distinction between center and periphery

- The main point of entry into the EU is the Mediterranean
- But principle destinations were in central Europe (pull factors)
- The main way of entry was irregular entries → Significant increase in secondary movements, so there was a return of the Dublin criterium

The change in the patterns of mixed migration flows

- The increase of the African route
- The role of smugglers
- The politicization of asylum
- The increased control of frontline MSs' asylum and entry policies

THE 2015 REFUGEE CRISIS

The clash between EU coordination and a return to national responses

- The diverging view of asylum between the North (we have done enough), South (we will not become a dumping ground for the EU's unwanted migrants) and East (migration is not our problem)
- Accompanied by the increasing politicization of migration
- The Mare Nostrum failure was indicative of the divergencies in long-term policy → Italy felt abandoned by EU after it neglected solidarity in welcoming migrants saved.
- It puts at risk the entire European enterprise

The view from the South

- Financial assistance is not enough
- What is necessary is an EU response to an EU problem
- The increasing political and human burden on first entry regions
- A rejection of the principle of sincere cooperation
- The ambivalent relations with neighbouring third countries, such as Turkey, Libya and Morocco

The view from the Center and the North (Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands)

- A limited effort in relocation
- Sufficient funding
- Emphasis on avoiding secondary movements

- Emphasis on creating safe third countries around Europe → According to this theory, central MSs would have zero refugees. Germany has the highest number of refugees, as it accepted to bypass this theory.

The view from the East

- The so-called Visegrad countries
- Refuse to support any form of solidarity mechanism
- On the grounds of moral and emotional rather than political and economic criteria
- The impact of perceptions

The politicization of migration

- A major issue in national politics
- Leads to an increase in xenophobia
- Played a role in the 2016 Brexit referendum
- The rise of anti-immigration parties in the South and in the Center
- Feeding into an anti-EU stance
- The first open revolt against EU policies in Hungary
- The significance of the problem

The unsuccessful efforts to find an EU solution

- Following the 2015 crisis, the Commission proposed a third wave of legislation, including
- Reform of the Dublin system to better allocate asylum applications among MSs and to guarantee a timely process of application
- Establish a fully-fledged EU asylum agency
- Establish a permanent EU resettlement framework
- These have been blocked due to disagreements between MSs.

The limits of Southern common front

- Even if all Southern states have insisted on having more solidarity in the area of migration, through a system of relocation quotas and a greater shared responsibility for migrant arrivals, each MS has different national priorities. Basically, they are all competing for limited resources.
- Relative indifference of Portugal
- Different priorities of Spain (Ceuta and Melilla)
- Conflicting priorities for Italy and Malta
- Domestic management issues for Greece
- The attraction of enhanced cooperation

The EU-Turkey statement (march 2006)

- A political agreement
- The context
- Turkey: a safe third country?
- The impossibility of mass returns from Greece
- The impact of potential court rulings
 - It was based on precarious assumptions and increasingly shaky
 - Could it be a model and at what price for Europe

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THE SOUTH AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF EU

Is there a southern perspective in the institutional evolution of EU?

Historical developments

- Southern EU MSs have common characteristics but are not uniform
- Society patterns, such as the role of families
- Role of the state → Centralization was an issue present throughout the South
- Late industrialization (after WWII)
- Small and medium business, often family led
- Significant and under developed agriculture
- They joined at different times and contexts, with different objectives and distinct conditions. Italy was a founding member, while the others joined in the 80s or 2000s. Greece and Spain had as their aim the consolidation of democratic achievements. Italy was a significant actor in the early European integration, while the membership for other countries was difficult, as they had to give up more to join a club that was already formed and which did not pay sufficient attention to their demands.

An asymmetric relationship

- South started from a dependence stance
- Early policies were focused on northern interests
- Only after the 80s, more southern specific priorities were included
- A slow process of understanding the nature of EU negotiations for Southern MSs. Southern Europeans lacked a capacity to mingle with this interest groups-led environment and interlocutors coming from other MSs, so to communication in general. An issue about intensity of preferences, linked to the concept of package deals.
- The emphasis on extra funding alters the relationship with European integration.

And the marginal influence over the institutions

- A relative indifference to the institutional developments
- Few institutional initiatives
- The 1983 Genscher-Colombo plan → It was a southern initiative, in which Italy took over from Germany.
- Accompanied with a relative marginalization of the South in major institutional positions
- Only two Italian Commission presidents
- One, Malfatti, resigned to run for office in Italy
- Draghi, the most Germanic Italian

A slow mutual rapprochement

- The relations between Southern countries were weak
- The predominance of center-peripheral relations and historic relations with specific MSs.
- Historical ties and divergencies among them.
- A different understanding on integration
- Southern states lacked functional, territorial and affiliation linkages

A common preference for an intergovernmental approach

- The traditional emphasis on the role of the executive played well in the early phases of integration.
- Less while supranational institutions were in the ascendancy
- An opposition to supranationalism, in particular among Iberian countries. Spain wanted to drive industrialization and modernity.
- The fear of losing influence
 - On the weighting of votes in Council
 - On the transitional lists
 - Over the *Spitzenkandidaten* issue

Aspects of personality in the relations between the South and the North.

The south persistently requests more Europe, but at the same time is more reluctant to accept more policy decisions taken by majority votes.

Which comes as an opposition to a common demand for more Europe

- The permanent request for an increased EU role in many policy areas
- Not only agriculture
 - The Greek demand for common defense policies
- And the efforts to combine national with EU measures and funds.

For instance, small Southern states often rejects proposals such that of reducing the number of Commissioners, as it would mean less presence in the decision making.

The South and the economic crisis

- The financial crisis that interested southern economies ha different root causes, and resulted in different solutions for each state → There wasn't a one size fit all solutions.
- There was not a significant southern solidarity in dealing with the crisis [with the exception of Italy that pushed for maintaining a European solidarity], as states were competing for different forms of bailout funding (Portugal vs Greece) and fighting the bailout fatigue (the case of Cyprus bail-in). Cyprus was the last to go through financial crisis had to undergo a bail in. It had problems related to over-lending of its banks, which gave a high interest rates. But when the crisis came, the banks were unable to pay these interests, and it led to the collapse of the banking system. One of the bank was liquidated by the government and deposits were lost.

The South and the economic crisis – a new cleavage?

- The Emu was viewed as mostly Northern-led and ignoring particular needs of weaker southern economies.
- This is a new cleavage that crosses national boundaries but is particularly felt in the South
- It represents both a North-South rift between creditor and debtor nations.
- And an intra-south cleavage that connects the defense of national culture and sovereignty to immigration and trade skepticism.

For many people, financial rules are linked to the capacity of the state to take decisions.

European Union and security

- Similar perceptions about EU in the field of security
 - Emphasis on the role of NATO and EU complementarity
 - Relatively low threat perceptions from RU
 - The significance of migration as a security issue

- Are accompanied by diverging opinions about the direction of relevant EU policies
- The issue of Turkey for GR and CY
- The final impact of an EU independent force; it might mean a higher expense for MSs to fund a defense that many in the South see as totally useless. For instance, a traditional army might not be the best way to protect MSs from terrorist attacks.

Perceptions of EU as a security actor → Southern states see EU as a transatlantic geopolitical project, which should not have a defense on its own.

The South and enlargement

- The legacy of the past
- The contribution of integration to underpinning a successful regime transition among southern members
- Clashed with the possibility of losing significant funding
- The special case of the Balkans in view of the future enlargement; for the South it would mean a higher contribution, poorer states that would need more funds. There is a clear division between those who want an expansion with less money and those who want the situation to remain still.

Southern MSs realizes the financial negative aspects of enlargement, but at the same time it could bear a positive result of expanding the southern front and consolidating their common front.

The future of EU

- The establishment of the Southern Eu countries Summit → It was established in Athens in 2016 and it includes France, in order to be able to counteract other regional groups.
- It followed the Visegrad model
- It aims to present a united front on various economic, geopolitical and policy objectives.
- The main objectives are:
 - Migration
 - MFF (and impact of loss of Brexit contribution) → The possible approach is to reduce the budget of EU taking away from traditional policies such as agriculture and regional development, but Southern MSs are against this.
 - Financing climate initiatives
- Emphasis on solidarity
- Maintaining the central role of states in the EU integration process

The ambivalent opinion about enhanced cooperation → They have not made clear what form of Europe they would prefer. They would like to have more common policies with less funding, but this is impossible.